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New Orleans levee report blames Army Corps

By: Dr. Jeff Masters, 3:37 PM GMT on March 23, 2007

The Army Corps of Engineers is largely to blame for the disastrous flooding of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, according to a 475-page report commissioned by the state Department of Transportation and Development that was released Wednesday. The five major findings of the report by "Team Louisiana":


Figure 1. Team Louisiana researchers discuss forensic developments at a section of the 17th Street Canal breach. Image credit: Team Louisiana.

1) The Army Corps failed to follow the 1965 Congressional mandate to protect against the "most severe combination of meteorological conditions reasonably expected." This mandate specified a "1 in 100 year storm" that the New Orleans levee system must protect against, which was set as a Category 2 hurricane with winds of 107 mph. In 1972, the National Weather Service adjusted the expected "1 in 100 year storm" to be a Category 3 hurricane with 129 mph winds. This was adjusted again in 1979 to a Category 4 hurricane with 140 mph winds. The Army Corp never revised their protection plans based on these new estimates, despite their mandate to do so and their awareness of the requirement to do so.

2) The New Orleans levees were built 1-2 feet too low, because the Army Corps used elevation estimates taken in 1929 to design the levees. The city has sunk over the years, and was already 1.3-1.6 feet lower than the 1929 elevation estimates in 1965 when the levee system was designed. Continued subsidence of the land resulted in levees that were up to five feet too low when Katrina struck. The Corps was aware of the subsidence issue, but did not correct for it. The levees being too low caused many of the failures that flooded New Orleans, the report asserts: Crown elevation deficiencies ranging up to 5 feet at the time Katrina struck resulted in prolonged overtopping of floodwalls and levees along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) and to the east in the Lake Borgne funnel that otherwise would have been overtopped only briefly. Prolonged overtopping led to catastrophic breaches into the Lower 9th Ward on the east and into Orleans Metro on the west, and contributed to the early failures of levees along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW)and MRGO. Early failure of the MRGO levee allowed the 32,000 acre wetland buffer between MRGO and 40 Arpent back levee to fill and overtop the 40 Arpent back levee while the surge was still rising, and resulted in catastrophic flooding in St.Bernard to an elevation of 11 ft.

3) The Army Corp did not follow existing engineering practice and guidance for construction of levees and floodwalls.

4) The free-flowing deep draft navigation channel on the east side (MRGO and GIWW channels) compromised system performance.

5) The levee system was "managed like a circa 1965 flood control museum", and was not maintained or upgraded properly.

The Army Corps yesterday issued a press release defending themselves, saying that all levels of government were involved in the poor decision making for New Orleans' levees, and the Corps should not be singled out for their failures. Regardless, the release of the Team Louisiana report will bolster the legal efforts to sue the Army Corps for damages from Katrina. These claims are currently at $400 billion and growing, including a claim of $77 billion from the city of New Orleans, and $200 billion from the state of Louisiana.

Next week, I plan to post a review of the Hurricane Katrina book by Team Louisiana's leader, Dr. Ivor van Heerden of Louisiana State University: The Storm: What went wrong and why during Hurricane Katrina--the inside story from one Louisiana scientist.

Jeff Masters

The views of the author are his/her own and do not necessarily represent the position of The Weather Company or its parent, IBM.

Reader Comments

Wowsa..Thanks foe the pics and the report itself Dr. M.

The Man Who Knew




Storm That Drowned a City homepage

"A slow-moving Category 3 hurricane or larger will flood the city. There will be between 17 and 20 feet of standing water, and New Orleans as we now know it will no longer exist."
Ivor van Heerden, October 29, 2004

For years, Ivor van Heerden, a hurricane expert at Louisiana State University, has seen it coming. Since 2001, he and colleagues have been generating computer models of how a major storm could inundate the region in and around New Orleans. And he and his team sought tenaciouslyat times desperatelyto have their warnings heeded by government officials.

In an interview with NOVA ten months before Katrina, van Heerden expressed some of his worst fears as well as his understanding that the federal government, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in particular, were finally grasping the need to prepare for a calamity. But in interviews conducted in Katrina's wake, van Heerden's anger at the federal government's response is clear.

Following are excerpts from van Heerden's interviews, both pre- (this page) and post-Katrina (next page).

Before the Flood

Interview conducted October 29, 2004

NOVA: If this regionNew Orleans, the wetlands, and allwere a patient in the hospital, how would you describe them? At what stage are they?

VAN HEERDEN: Close to death.

NOVA: Really? Don't hold back.

VAN HEERDEN: (laughter) Thank you. Louisiana is a terminally ill patient requiring major surgery, a patient that if it was given a new heart and new lungs and a new liver would live. If it isn't, it's going to die. That's the equivalent.
An ominous scenario

NOVA: Walk me through the worst-case scenarioif a hurricane hits New Orleans.

VAN HEERDEN: If we look at the case of a slow-moving Category 3 passing west of the city, the floodwaters push into Lake Pontchartrain, and then they push through some highly industrialized areas. As they pass through these areas, they pick up a lot of chemicals. Remember, the flooding is occurring at the same time as a lot of wind damage, a lot of things breaking and coming apart. So these highly contaminated waters then flow into the city.

Within the city you have about 300,000 people who haven't left. There are about 57,000 families in New Orleans that don't own a motor vehicle. They can't get out. There are numerous homeless folk who can't get out. And then there's the disabled or bedridden. And those are the folk who have the least resources, the least ability to cope with what's going to happen.

While the flooding starts, these people are dealing with the winds pulling buildings apart, trees coming down, whatever. For the first five hours the water rises very slowly. But then it rises very, very rapidly. It rises higher than the average home's roof. So those 300,000 people, most of them, are going to have to leave their homes. They're going to end up hanging on to light poles, trees, trying to swim to high-rise buildings.

Were in essence going to have a refugee camp.

There is the potential for extremely high casualtiespeople not only killed by flying debris, drowning in the soup, but also just imagine, how do we rescue the survivors? Unlike a river flood, it doesn't come up and go down. The water stays. And it stays for months and months and months. How do you rescue all of these people? If there's 200,000 survivors, you get 20,000 out a day, that's 10 days. So how are they going to hang on? You know, this is one of the big nightmares: how do you rescue those survivors? What are they going to need?

They're going to need to be detoxified. And this is Louisianait's 100 degrees Fahrenheit, 100 percent humidity. Putrefaction and fermentation go on very, very rapidly. So those folk are going to be surrounded by the proverbial witches' brew of toxins.

In addition to the folk that have to be rescued, we've got about 700,000 residents who can't come home. They're going to have to be housed in tent cities. When you start pulling groups of people like this into close confinement, the potential of very serious diseases goes up dramatically.

So just imagine, you've got this super, super crowdinghighly, highly stressed folk. They don't have a home. They don't have a job. They don't see any future. They're living in tents. It's hot, humid Louisiana. And now you have the potential of disease.

These are some of the worst-case scenarios. We will have almost a million displaced persons that are going to be totally dependent on the state. We're in essence going to have a refugee camp. And it's going to require a massive operation to try and bring some normality into these people's lives.
Preparing for disaster

NOVA: Is this something that a state can handle? The State of Louisiana?

VAN HEERDEN: No, this is definitely something that requires the full resources of the U.S. government. We are fortunate that the federal government is starting to recognize that this is a serious problem. In July of this year [2004] we had an exercise called the Hurricane Pam exercise, where all the federal agencies got together with state agencies. We did a simulation of what would happen, and then these agencies got together and tried to decide how they would deal with a flooded New Orleans. So there is some recognition now, especially by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, that this is a catastrophe that's right on the horizon.

NOVA: How great is the risk of this happening?

VAN HEERDEN: If we look in the last eight years, we have had two near misses of New Orleans [Hurricane Georges in 1998 and Hurricane Ivan in 2004]. And as the wetlands fall apart, the potential of these hurricanes to do major destruction through storm surges rises and rises and rises. So every year that goes by, the probability of this killer storm occurring increases. Statistics right now would suggest maybe once every seven to eight years we're going to have a near miss.

NOVA: So if there's a chance of a big hurricane and this scenario playing out every seven or eight years, what's the solution? What could be done?

VAN HEERDEN: There are two very important mitigation activities that the federal government has to pursue today. Number one is our wetlands protect us from a surge. Our wetlands and barrier islands are our outer line of defense. We need to restore them. Now, that's in the longer term.

In the shorter term, we can start thinking about how can we reduce the amount of water that flows into Lake Pontchartrain and then floods the city? We need to be really innovative, think outside the box, and in addition we've got to change the way federal government does business. You can't give these sort of projects to the Corps of Engineers and have them mull over it for 20 years before it gets built. We need a group that's independent of the political system, that's well funded, has the right experts advising it, and then gets in and does it.

Every year that goes by, the probability of this killer storm occurring increases.

This is the United States of America. This is the most powerful country in the world. It has unbelievable resources. At, literally, the snap of the President's finger, we can spend $40 billion in Iraq. If we can start rebuilding their infrastructure immediately, we can do the same thing back home. At the snap of the President's finger, perhaps, we could spend the $16-20 billion that's needed to save New Orleans. All it takes is the will to do it.

NOVA: What do you think it takes to create that will? Does it take a catastrophe?

VAN HEERDEN: The unfortunate thing is, it does look like it's going to need a catastrophe in order to mobilize it.
Van Heerdan told them way before the event..it was acoming folks.But..he was alas..unheard by the powers that be, were and are.
If I knew it was coming, I'd at least have a skiff with an outboard or at least a few wave runners in the garage...I would encourage my neighbors to do the same. Noah's ark type of deal.

Nice blog Dr. Masters.With New Orleans now having occured...what's the new worst case hurricane scenario?New York,or Tampa?BBL
Dr Masters, Patrap. I am not trying to defend the Corps per se. Was just trying to post my memories of those articles that I read even before the tragedy happened. Liability cannot even pay for all the human loses, suffering, and those that don't have anything to start all over again. However, I do know the insides and the fights of certain government agencies to get things done and well done. They are tampered by red tape and politics. It happens in my field of biomedical research, which without it, every single American pays for it since it is the basis from where medical doctors work. It is the first field to see funds going away to matters like the war in Irak. That was my only point. I wish that the people that lost so much can ever rebuild their lives.
Worst case scenario...a strong hurricane coming towards your house on the coast. Doesnt matter where.
The only video of the 17th ST Canal Breach August 29th as it occurred..The same area in Dr. Masters photo in his entry..
There is a list of many Kris! We got a little taste of what can happen in Ft. Lauderdale with Wilma! And look at Singer Island in West Palm, 100 story highrise completely compromised and to this day unlivable. Had it been a storm stronger than Jeanne, who knows what would have happened. My guess is that the building would've collapsed. Most of the highrises up the coast were built pre Andrew. But, if I had to pick a worst case it would have to be Tampa.
Big difference in Tampa compared to New Orleans is the water will receed in Tampa.
I agree with Myles.

So if a Cat 4 or above comes through Galveston Bay and up the Houston Ship Channel, that would be MY worst case scenario.
The look from above of the same area..August 30th 2005..am..NOAA imagery.The breach..the dry Jefferson side..the Condo the fireman were in...click to enlarge.You can see actual rescues in progress in Lakeview.Just look for boat wakes..Link
I still think NYC seeing a Cat 2 or low 3 would be worst case. Take a look at the bathmetrey of the NY Bight (the perfect 90* angle caused by NJ and LI) The waters are shallow out to around 50 miles or so and are a gental slope. Thus any water surge would begin to pile up deeper and taller as it gets funneled twords NY Harbour and up the Hudson river, through the Kill Van Kull, into Jamacia Bay, up the East Side River. Now add to that that most of Manhattan is only a few feet above sea level AND (this is huge) most of the underground of NYC is subways and tunnels for communication/electric/gas you can see what a disaster this would be. Add to the fact that most buildings are only rated to 85mph winds and one can only imagine. Dont forget that wind speed and air pressures rise as elevation does. Thus most buildings are 20 to 50 stories in the area and covered in glass. Take NYC proper out of the equation.. you have the Port of NY and NJ. The largest commercial port on the entire east coast (that includes the gulf). 75% of all economic goods to the eastern half of the country flow through the port. I work in the port and can tell you we sometimes flood during a good high tide so imagine what a storm surge would do to us. Besides the loss of the containers carrying the goods the gantrey cranes would collapse as they did in Japan thus a loss of productivity for up to a year or more due to the fact the cranes are built overseas in Italy and are only built during an order (thus no standby's) there are currently 30 cranes in operation. With a company taking close to 6 months to build, assemble, test a single crane.. do the math.

If you notice, I havent once talked about human effects strictly econmic and infastructure. A quick look at human effects... noone except floridan (gulf coaster) transplants would know there arse from their elbow as to what to do.

Yes as stated before the worst case for anyone is a storm bearing down on their home. Yes Tampa would be a large disater on the order of New Orleans in terms of distruction BUT as to the most disasterous scenario is a NYC storm that would paralize global commerce and distrupt the lives of millions if not billions of Americans.
I agree, a major hurricane invading NYC would prove to be disasterous because of the huge population and lack of knowledge for preparedness. Though the loss of life may be minimal, economically it would be hellfire. With the current projections of rising sea levels and higher base temperatures, I think the government should plan ahead for this disaster. One thing is for certain, the scenario has happened in the past and no doubt will happen again someday.
I dont even think a major would be needed a think a mid to strong Cat 2 would do the job
I was just wondering - With the coming sea rise of 27 ft. caused by man made climate change, how high will the levees have to be. Is it possible to build levees that high?
Thank you Dr. M. While NO had the worst time, no question, it was NOT the hurricane itself that did it. Those in MS suffered that ugly much more. Shame on the Corp and our government for allowing it to happen after years of studies knowing it could/would happen. What would have happened had they been hit straight on, or on the NE side of Katrina or another storm? I shudder to think.
27ft?Where'd you hear that?
I didn't think it was that much.
hello
Well lets hope everything is fixed here in New Orleans. Its great to see congress voted today to give us more funding for the levees.
I just hope they just get the funds out in time for ya'll!
actually, when it comes to levee/dike building, there would be ways to do it, as shown over in The Netherlands and Belgium. They're also looking at some super project over in Venice, IT because of their problems. I'm sure we could engineer our way of just about anything. It's a matter of could we pay for such structures an would theory be made into the real world.

But as for worst case scenarios in different places, that was actually put out several years ago by Bob Sheets (the former head of the NHC). If I could only find that list off hand.
Sorry I didn't give the 27Ft reference. It is the figure Al Gore gave in Barbra Boxer's Senate committee hearing on the Envirnoment, last Wednesday. Maybe the figure is wrong, but that is what he gave. I don't know, that's why I was asking. The bloggers here seem to be quite knowledgable.
I think its mentioned in his book Hurricane Watch.
Can a major hurricane even get to NY? I thought the water was too cold that north to keep it strong?
27ft is an estimate, since when is an estimate 100% accurate? I can get my car fixed for an estimated 200 bucks but after its all said and done they charge me 130 bucks more for extra labor and parts shipping...

Who knows, maybe the number will be higher than 27...
So given 27ft rise in sea level is an estimate that may or may not be correct, then how high should we build the levees. Using Al Gores estimate of 27ft and given that New Orleans is somewhere around 10 ft below sea level now. That puts the levees at around 40ft. Are they any other estimates on the rise in sea level caused by global warming?
livinginnavarre, Like you, I didn't think hurricanes got this for north. But, I found this site on the Internet -A history of Hurricanes New York that mentions several hurricanes that hit New York and one in 1893 the caused the complete disappearance of Hog Island. Actually I had never heard of Hog Island before.
32. rlk
The 1938 hurricane was apparently a cat 3 when it hit Long Island. I read somewhere that it's thought that the northeast could get hit by a cat 4.

While the water near the northeast coast is rather cold, hurricanes that hit the northeast are typically moving very fast, so they don't spend much time over the colder water -- they might leave the Gulf Stream only 3-6 hours before landfall, which simply doesn't give them much time to spin down. The 1938 storm, for example, had a forward speed of about 60 MPH.

That also means that the wind speed to the right of the storm is considerably increased. The radius of maximum winds also tends to increase.

The difficult part about a storm hitting NYC is that it would have to really thread a needle in order for NYC to be to the right of the center without the storm being over land for an extended period of time (which would weaken it rapidly). Basically, it would have to be moving to the NNW or so at a good clip -- i. e. it wouldn't have completed recurvature. This would require a strong negatively tilted trough, and those aren't that common in August and September. A neutral or positively tilted trough would tend to push the storm to the NNE or thereabouts. This would put south coastal New England more under the gun -- Providence, for example. Narragansett Bay apparently had a 20-30' storm surge in 1938 which killed a lot of people.

Boston's better protected against a south to southeast wind; east to northeast winds are more dangerous. With a typical storm moving to the NNE, that would put Boston to the left of the center, a much less dangerous (from a wind standpoint) place in a rapidly moving storm.

Then again, Hazel in 1954 apparently generated a wind gust of 113 MPH or so at the Battery (southern tip of Manhattan) despite having been over land for 24 hours or so at time of closest approach. The 1938 storm generated cat 5 winds (180 MPH or so 1-minute wind speed) at Blue Hill, but that's at 600' elevation, so it doesn't mean all that much for sea level winds.
Posted By: upyouns at 7:20 PM GMT on March 23, 2007.

So given 27ft rise in sea level is an estimate that may or may not be correct, then how high should we build the levees. Using Al Gores estimate of 27ft and given that New Orleans is somewhere around 10 ft below sea level now. That puts the levees at around 40ft. Are they any other estimates on the rise in sea level caused by global warming?




What the heck does Al Gore know?Last time I checked the guy wasn't a climate expert.He's a politician with a 12000$ electric bill,who uses tons more gas in a month than most people do all year.I'm not arguing the number...I'm arguing the source.People take him and what he says way too seriously.
And nice explanation about New York hurricanes rlk.
Hey the give the guy a break, he invented the internet...yeah right
7..Al Gore at Least Knows NOAA Radios can save lives. "Tell Um AL"..Link
I'm not saying 27ft is wrong...I'm saying don't depend on Al Gore for global warming information.He's a politician who likes to put a spin on things that is favorable for him and his party.
Cheneys Just a Bad shot..LOL!
Its a two-way street Kris..always.
Myself,..no way Id miss a Lawyer..LOL!..Friday for sure here.



"He's a politician,and they're not to be trusted."
Posted By: Patrap at 8:05 PM GMT on March 23, 2007.

Its a two-way street Kris..always.



Of course Patrap.Were he a republican,I'd say the same thing.
1) The Army Corps failed to follow the 1965 Congressional mandate to protect against the "most severe combination of meteorological conditions reasonably expected." This mandate specified a "1 in 100 year storm" that the New Orleans levee system must protect against, which was set as a Category 2 hurricane with winds of 107 mph. In 1972, the National Weather Service adjusted the expected "1 in 100 year storm" to be a Category 3 hurricane with 129 mph winds. This was adjusted again in 1979 to a Category 4 hurricane with 140 mph winds. The Army Corp never revised their protection plans based on these new estimates, despite their mandate to do so and their awareness of the requirement to do so.


Wait...you mean that in '65 it was thought a 1-in-100 year storm would be CAT 2 on the Gulf Coast?Wow,how bad were records then?
The problem with Tampa bay will be the notice we get. Any storm making the right hand turn will be moving fast. Charley was over Cuba the morning it hit. When Wilma started to move it only took a day to get to Florida. Pinellas county (Clearwater and St. Pete) is the most densely populated county in Florida and we have only 3 bridges to get out. A cat 3 or higher 75% of the county will be under water. Then you have Tampa. Tampa is at sea leave so any surge will be how high the water is on any of the buildings, but the major problem with the Tampa bay area is getting people out in time. Getting out for Charley was a nightmare (5 hours to drive 10 miles) and only 40% of the people that should have left really left.
Good points crackerlogic.Tampa would be a bad scenario,but I think a Cat 5 rippin' through Miami...then crashin' what's left of New Orleans and the refineries on the way...would be the worst.
in 65 Kris..we were just gathering the data..Sats had only come on line a few years.Betsy..the last Hurricane of Force to strike New Orleans before Katrina caused those numbers..Heres a lil 8mm clip from Betsys water in St Bernard and the 9th ward in 1965.. Link
thanks
All the Major Refineries are above New Orleans Kris..by many miles..Norco and above.
So given 27ft rise in sea level

Hmmm... Did you actually mean 27 INCHES? Link (I couldn't find much for "27 feet").

Anyway, I think that we need to overhaul our government... I mean, look at this:

The Outstanding Public Debt as of 23 Mar 2007 at 08:13:28 PM GMT is:


All of that money and they waste most of it on worthless junk that most people have never even heard of... not things that REALLY matter... I say lets sue the government and Army Corps.
All the Refinery info..Link
You know the talk of cat 5 is irrelevant....that cat 1..that ripped your roof off...is your worst nightmare.....that cat nothing..that flooded your home..is your worst nightmare...you need categories to quantify...but remember...if you've been in a hurricane...it's not about the windspeed..it's about how you fared through it
Houston has an awful lot of refineries....perhaps moreso than any other location in the country. I don't know for sure.

You think evacuating Tampa is difficult. Try four million Houstonians and the million living in the burbs.

Some simple numbers.. Louisiana Refineries
Louisiana has 17 active refineries. At its peak, the state had more than 30 operating refineries. The operating refineries in Louisiana account for approximately 16 percent of the nation's refining capacity.

A listing of the Louisiana operating refineries along with location and crude oil capacity as of 2003 is provided below.
Refinery Location bbls/day
Calcasieu Refining Lake Charles 15,680
Calumet Lubricants
Cotton Valley

8,500
Calumet Lubricants Princeton 9,500
Calument Lubricants
Shreveport
15,000
Chalmette Refining, LLC Chalmette 182,500
Citgo Petroleum Lake Charles 336,801
ConocoPhillips Lake Charles 250,000
ConocoPhillips
Belle Chasse
250,000
ExxonMobil Baton Rouge 493,500
Marathon Ashland Petroleum LLC Garyville 232,000
Motiva Enterprises, LLC
Convent

225,000
Motiva Enterprises, LLC
Norco

220,000
Murphy Oil
Meraux

95,000
Placid Refining Co., LLC Port Allen 48,000
St. Rose Refining (Shell) St. Rose 55,000
Valero Energy
Krotz Springs

84,000
Valero St. Charles Refinery
Norco
155,16
Sorry, but you ruffled my tail feathers.

Houston gets ignored a lot....and I resent it.
Louisiana ,Texas and Alabama..Americas Saudi Arabia.Fear the Cat 3 or Higher Coastal Impactor of these Gasoline providers.A major strike has Global implications.Way more than 3 bucks a gal after Katrina.The worlds a much different place since Aug 05.
Houston is not the biggest potential disaster.The evacuation system(as shown in Rita) needs completely reworked,and building codes are substandard.But in all likelyhood,the same could be said for New York and New York is much more economically important.
Thank you Pat.
I don't think I need to discuss this anymore, you're ticking me off Kris.
Cindy in July 05 is a great example ric..Fast forming..Strenghtend coming in.Wacked New Orleans overnight on a Sunday.People woke up Mon day..thinking Gee..Wow!.Then she ripped the roof off the Atlanta Motor Speedway and we all said wow!..Gee?.. Cindy killed 4.
Posted By: ihave27windows at 2:20 PM CST on March 23, 2007.

Houston gets ignored a lot....and I resent it.


Houston does get ignored alot, and I really don't know why. Anyway, Houston and vicinity is definately a key city to the US, and one of the worst US cities (if not the worst) for a Hurricane to hit. Period.
Where's Houston?
What's your problem 27?If you're actually getting mad over this...you have a problem.
I'm not trying to insult you or anything.
And for the record...Houston gets ignored because it's been a long time since a big strike there.24 years.
And hello Bob and 1900h.
Cindys landfall loop..Link
Very funny Bob.

I can't argue with New York being more important than Houston, but after a major hurricane strikes the city, say hello to $4.00+ a gallon of gasoline!
Ironically, the most exposed town, Key West, FL, has been through some nasty ones but always recovered well. Besides that storm in the 1920's or 1930's that swept an entire train except the locomotive into the gulf, the island continues to prosper. The lowland cities like Naw'lins and Houston and Galveston are always at more risk. Florida's aquifer and great natural resource, The Everglades, keep the top ground from huge quantities of standing water. If I had to pick which part of a storm was worse, it would definetly be the water over wind.
Hello weatherboykris.
7 weeks later..when SSTs were peaking..IT came.Link
No one city is ever more important than another..Were a nation.Not a social club.That kinda thinking caused the delay here in help.
Crawfish & Crabs a calling.We off to a seafood berl..later folks.
I agree Pat, but seriously, there are people in the mountains up in the Dakotas that could really care less about the gulf region and their voting habits and attitudes slow legislation for aid and prevention.
Hey, I love Houston. I was an Oiler fan!! So very true MP.
Also Patrap...the delay in aid was caused by the already stretched resources.A few storms had already made landfall.
Allison wasnt a stike by a Hurricane on Houston Kris.But the Tropical Storm inundated Houstonians and killed 13 or more.
Love ya blue! Go Oilers! Yeah, I was a Moon fan for a long time..
Kris..ya need mo reading on that friend.LOL
Alicia flooded Houston in the 80's
My eyes saw it a lot differently.As did the world.
Oh yeah,Allison.You're right about that,but Allison wasn'ta major wind producer.People weren't wowed by beautiful satellite pics,or amazed by low pressure reports.It enforced the mentality that Houston gets mostly weak storms.
I cried when Moon was inducted into the Hall of Fame!!..LOL Ok, sorry, I am done with the sports talk.
One quick post ---

Michael -- re: suing the government and the Corp... where do you think the money they would pay out comes from? I think most likely you and me .. the taxpayers.

Would that really solve the problem?

I certainly am not qualified to argue this one ... just know more often than not we focus on blame rather than solutions, and that is going to be the downfall of the US. That, and the "me, me, me" attitude, as well as the almighty dollar matters more than people's lives ...

I'd vote for a purple people eater if I thought they'd really cowboy up and get rid of the red tape and try for solutions. .... I think it'll be hard for anybody to really effect major changes in our society/government.

Solutions won't be easy and I for one feel that we are running out of time ...


Now back to your regularly scheduled conversation on hurricanes ...


(sorry 03 ... this is awfully close to politics ... LOL.... but is really more how I feel about society)
My parents went through Alicia when they lived in Katy. They said it wasn't that bad. Of course, Alicia was a cat 2 when she reached Katy.
Scarlett, I actually agree with you on this one:)
Weak storm?

I love debates like this!
I cried when Manning went to Houston..o3.Archie that is..
THUD ...

Ouch ... just fell off my chair ...
CYL
:)

"Relativity is just a point of view"...Einstein
Yeah, so did I Pat!..LOL
Weatherboykris

I agree 100%. damage to the Miami area will be scary if any storm hit.. What i was trying to say is.. if a major storm would hit Miami, New York. Will have some notice and it is not as hard to get to safe areas. The last i heard it would take at least 72 hours to get the Tampa Bay area out. I don't think we will have the time to get out, and i am said to say the body count will be a lot higher than Katrina.
Two things here 1900...first, check your facts,the 1900 storm hit Galvelston,not Houston.In fact,Houston benefited from the storm,as it stunted the growth of Galvelston.Second,I was talking about Houston,not Texas as a whole.Houston has been hit by only one major hurricane I can think of right away,and that was a Cat 3 24 years ago.
In fact,Houston benefited from the storm,as it stunted the growth of Galvelston.

That is true - if that storm hadn't occurred, Galveston would be in Houston's place right now.
You're probably right,crackerlogic.
Yes I know that the 1900 hurricane hit Galveston, but back then, there were no oil refineries lining the coast, asking to be destroyed. There was no port of Houston to be inundated by 20+ feet of water. My point is that if a similar storm made landfall today, the effects could cause chaos on a grand scale in the Houston Metro.
I love debates!

: )
Of course they would...but that is not the nation's worst case scenario,hurricane-wise,anyway.
ihave27windows


I think tamp bay and Houston have the same amount of people, but we only have 3 bridges to get out
Its not really neccasary to discuss the Lost from 05.Or compare it to a possible future event.The dead no longer care to hear the debate.Thanks
They no longer have a voice ..in it.
One must have a plan of action.Its easy to stay ahead of a threat.Leave early..Leave prepared.Its not rocket science.Its common sense.Many here trusted the levees..and paid for that with ..all.
I think tamp bay and Houston have the same amount of people

Acutally, there is a very large difference in the population of Houston and Tampa.

list of US cities by population
I must leave now cause teresas giving me the LOOK!..LOL~
ihave27windows


I think tamp bay and Houston have the same amount of people, but we only have 3 bridges to get out
The dead no longer care to hear the debate.Thanks

Morbid but true, RIP.
lets sue the ACOE so bad that they'll never be able to fund an adequate levee system.. that'll show 'em!
But in all likelyhood,the same could be said for New York and New York is much more economically important.

Speaking from purely a southern perspective - I Beg to differ with this opinion!

Be back shortly. See y'all later!

: )
You want to see an evacuation disaster, throw a cat 5 at South Florida again. Millions trying to get out via 2 highway's and nowhere to go but up.
Hello SG.Facts are facts.To the nation(and the world for that matter),New York is more important economically than Houston.
Bye 1900
Why was the ACOE commisioned to build the levees anyway!? I can understand in pre WWII days but independent contractors might have done a better job in this modern era. And it would be easier now to make/force an independent contractor(s) to pay for and rebuild the levees than the ACOE.
Ignore my last comment. I'm still here!
nowhere to go but up.

Yes, and there's no stopping a storm from following you up as well...
New York is a very important city to the US, BUT...

It smells bad there.
list of US cities by population

I think that this is a better list because it includes not just the city itself but the metro area. In any case, Houston is a lot bigger.
To the nation(and the world for that matter),

There's no accountin' for taste.

Truly Kris, you're a good kid.....but, I wasn't just referring to hurricanes. Houston tends to get ignored anyway.

The storm you refer to 24 yrs ago was Alicia. I was 19, and we got the nasty side of her. The eye passed within 15 miles of our home. Scared the living doo out of me.

One more thing, Galveston has only one bridge, and two ferries.....small ferries.
5,280,077? There's more of us than that!
1900hurricane

Did you count St Pete and Clearwater, and Bradenton it is just not Tampa. That is why they call it tampa bay area
weatherboy - I really am being fascicious but New York is not important to me at all - unless they try to evacuate their gangs to my home town - then we gotsa problem!
Two bridges.
When Alicia passed through, I was -8.
unless they try to evacuate...

How do you evacuate over 18 million people (including the suburbs)? Espacially when considering that hurricanes that hit the Northeast are often moving very quicky (Long Island Express?)
127. ryang
Hey Guys.
Hello ryang! We're debating.
i guess it's important to look at numbers...but...i guess i see the humaness in it..it's the 1 person that is affected...it's his delimna..to him..it's not about cities..population....it's personal...to debate which it would hurt more...seems ridiculous to me
What other bridge 1900?

My husband works in Galveston...he's never mentioned another bridge.

Cracker, Michaels ling had the metro area populations.

Houston is quite a bit larger than the Tampa Bay area.
131. ryang
map

Water flows over a breached levee in New Orleans.
Ric, I'm not debating who gets hurt more....I'm just tired of Houston being ignored.
What other bridge 1900?

There's one one the far western side of the island, going towards Freeport.
plus the west coast of florida really does not get much notice. Charley was over cuba the morning it hit. Willma only took a day to cross the gulf when it started to move and untill a storm hits the gulf any part of west florida is game
135. ryang
Katrina Wasn't The Problem

It was the Levees.

Here is another list of population:

Combined Statistical Area
i'm not ignoring them......i'm including all people.....
Ok, well it makes sense that my husband would not have used that bridge. I was thinking there were ferries going to Freeport as well. Lived here all my life and just now learning there's a bridge to Freeport. LOL
139. ryang
When Katrina hit, the winds were down to just a little over 100 miles per hour (Category Three), so this wasn't the monster described. The storm passed through with minor damage, but the storm surge from the Gulf, caused Lake Pontchartrain to rise three feet.
140. ryang
Is Sabotage A Possibility?

I'm outa here...gotta go make dinner.

Have fun all.

Ric, it's ok to smile....lol
142. ryang
map

Red area the problem!
damn....i wasn't smiling.......but i am now..thanx

Posted By: Patrap at 10:11 PM CDT on March 21, 2007.

More From The Times-Picayune | Subscribe To The Times-Picayune
Corps caused disaster, report says
State inquiry finds decades of blunders
Wednesday, March 21, 2007
By Bob Marshall

Decades of incompetence and neglect by the Army Corps of Engineers allowed Hurricane Katrina's storm surge to devastate New Orleans, according to a long-awaited report being released today, the state's only official investigation into the causes of the disaster.

In a sweeping indictment of corps stewardship, the report alleges that agency supervisors ignored increases in the threat level for their project, knowingly built levees and floodwalls lower than congressionally mandated, failed to detect or ignored glaring errors during the review process, underestimated the impact of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet on the city's defenses, and failed to properly maintain the system.

The report, conducted by Team Louisiana at the request of the Department of Transportation and Development, echoes many points made in other probes last year, including that of the Independent Levee Investigation Team, led by the University of California-Berkeley, and the interim report from the corps' own Independent Performance and Evaluation Team. But while those efforts focused largely on technical aspects of the structural failures, the LSU-based Team Louisiana sought to pinpoint the decisions that caused those failures.





"It's one thing to use modern, state-of-the-art computer modeling and determine what happened, and the other teams did a very good job of that," said Ivor van Heerden, a director of the LSU Hurricane Center who led Team Louisiana. "But the only way to really understand if mistakes were made was by relying entirely on using the (engineering) tools the corps would have used -- or should have used -- when they did their designs."

A spokesman for the corps' hurricane protection office in New Orleans said officials there have not yet seen the report and had no comment.

18-month effort

The 10-member investigative team, including seven Louisiana State University engineering and storm researchers and three private sector engineers, spent almost 18 months and $200,000 on the effort, including a $100,000 grant from its major backer, the state Department of Transportation and Development. Among the key findings:

-- By ignoring two increases in the severity of the Standard Project Hurricane -- the model storm the system was designed to thwart -- the corps knowingly failed its 1965 congressional charge to protect the city against "the most severe combination of meteorological conditions reasonably expected."

The original model was based on research through 1959. But the corps did nothing to strengthen the system in response to two increases in the projected strength of the model storm, in 1972 and 1979.

"The standard set by Congress in 1965 was very specific -- 'the most severe threat that could be expected,' " van Heerden said. "Our research shows very clearly that the standard was changed, but the corps just kept going about its business as if nothing happened." Katrina, a Category 3 storm when it made landfall, fell far short of the expectation of the most severe hurricane.

-- In 1985, the head of the project ordered his staff to ignore an official reduction in the elevation of the land they were building on, which meant the corps finished levees and floodwalls it knew were as much as 2 feet lower than claimed. That decision helped turn Katrina from an inconvenience into a catastrophe.

"Had the walls been built as high as called for, the floodwalls in the Lower 9th Ward would have been overtopped for 1.5 hours, but instead water poured over them for 4.5 hours," van Heerden said.






He said the extra three hours resulted in deep trenching on the protected side of the floodwalls, contributing to the collapse that sent a wall of water roaring through the neighborhood, killing more than 100 people and displacing an entire sector of the city.

Below-design walls and levees contributed to many of the more than 50 breaches the system sustained during Katrina, the researchers said.

More findings

-- Applying the corps' own design manuals in use at the time, Team Louisiana found instances where the agency missed glaring engineering mistakes by subcontractors, which led to breaches including those on the 17th Street and London Avenue canals.

In one instance, local firm Eustis Engineering botched a standard engineering formula in deciding that a thin layer of clay at the bottom of the London Avenue Canal could prevent water from seeping into highly porous sands below, the report said. During Katrina, water pushed through the clay, quickly traveling through the sand to the dry-land side of the sheet pilings, weakening the levee and leading to a catastrophic breach. Eustis Engineering has declined to comment in the past on the matter and could not be reached for comment Tuesday.

"Had the corps caught that error -- as it is supposed to -- and required the work to have been done properly, in all likelihood the design would have been changed, which could have prevented this failure," van Heerden said.

"We found several stances where (better) designs were originally proposed -- T-walls instead of I-walls -- and then changed for no apparent reason." -- The corps failed to maintain the parts of the system properly, including keeping pace with subsidence. Moreover, the agency ignored advances in engineering knowledge and technology that could have prevented the flood.

The system "was managed like a circa 1965 flood-control museum," the report reads, pointing out that the corps made no improvements to account for well-known changes in elevations, sea-level rise or even gaps left in the system.

Paul Kemp, who was part of Team Louisiana as an LSU storm modeler, said he was "struck by the fact that the corps showed no sense of mission on this project, even though it was involved with it for more than 40 years.





Instead, the agency showed "absolute adherence" to obsolete standards -- a 1959 model for the Standard Project Hurricane. And yet the corps seemed willing, Kemp said, to make other wholesale changes midstream, such as abandoning a proposal to install floodgates at the canals in the mid-1980s, which might have stopped the Katrina surge that broke through their walls.

"It looked like no one was really in charge," he said.

Calls for 8-29 panel

The report also calls for the state and Congress to hold "8-29 Commissions" for a full investigation of the disaster, passage of a "Katrina Recovery Bill" to ensure coastal restoration and flood protection are fully financed by the federal government, and more transparency on the part of federal and state authorities when discussing flood protection plans.

"Citizens of New Orleans were never told by those with both knowledge and responsibility just how vulnerable they were to flooding, or the public safety compromises made in designing and building structures," the report states
145. ryang
New Orleans Sits Between The Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain.Link
146. ryang
To Fix It Would Be Minor, Just Needing Some Cement and a Metal Brace.Link
Posted By: ryang at 4:22 PM CDT on March 23, 2007.

Is Sabotage A Possibility?


What happened was bad enough; to think that somebody actually blew up the levees or something is even worse. Although in a way that is what happened - but it was because they failed to improve the levees for decades.
9th Ward..3
151. ryang
Katrina Pushed Water Into Lake Pontchartrain.

map

Katrina's track headed right for Lake Pontchartrain, a 40-mile-wide shallow reservoir whose waters are already above the city.

Animation of the Katrina surge and how the breaches occurred..Link
153. ryang
BTW check my blog for possible development in the altantic.
Guerra Family Storm Surge video,Chalmette,St Bernard Parish.
Vaccarella Family....St Bernard also..
A Storm no one will remember.. Cindy in 056
The Storm No one will forget..Katrina, 7 weeks later. 5
I watched cindy form while we were in Cancun then came home to sleep through it the next night. It was wierd b/c for the last two days we were there, you could tell something was happening. It was quite a surprise when we got back to the N.O.
Cindy was a good blow for sure.The tree debris alone caused alot of trouble..
yea, I remember the house shaking @ midnight
NW Carribean? No chance. Not for 10 weeks.
Those Youtube videos should be shown the next time a major hurricane approaches a vulnerable coast. Those images are pretty incredible--I wonder why we haven't seen them before?
Don't forget the environ-mentals who fought vigorously and successfully with the Corp. for decades over new construction of levee's. But of course they know best.
Cat 3 plus power Gulfport Miss August 29,2005
Weather paparazzi Footage,Excellent..Link
Tuesday,,August 30th..so quiet. LinkVeterans Blvd at 17th St Canal also...
Check out this low off of Africa:

http://www.ssd.noaa.gov/PS/TROP/DATA/RT/EATL/IR4/20.jpg
i think the wind shear and ssts are close enough to the threshold for some developement to occurwww.ssd.noaa.gov/PS/TROP/DATA/RT/EATL/IR4/20.jpg
any comments???????
It's part of the ITCZ, and the shear/sst doesnt matter since it's at like 5 degrees N. Anything under 10N is considered to have no chance. In fact, it would be the farthest south Atlantic storm ever formed/exsisted, since there's only been a few to form or go below 10N, and the lowest was 7N.
While not disputing the findings on the report issued by the State
Department of Transportation & Development, my memory tells me
of testimony given by Corps of Engineers spokespersons who cite
reports they made that corroborate the potential for disaster....
reports made years earlier, urging that funds be made available for
levee repair.

These funds were never allocated in nearly the amount needed.

The Corps of Engineers' work is largely done by civilian
contractors. Unless and until funding is allocated, no work is done,
irrespective of urgent recommendations made by The Corps.

This is not meant to diminish the findings of the report, nor in any way to minimize the horrendous consequences of Katrina; the
suffering and devastation.

One has only to read the work of John McPhee, The Control of Nature; his essay on the Mississippi Delta and levee system there..... written years before Katrina..... to understand how Nature has fulfilled early predictions, and how "The People" and their elected
representatives, didn't respond to the message.
anyone here? if so , any predictions on how active 2007 hurricane activity may be?
2007 predictions and more..Link
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration issued 2007 hurricane predictions that there would be between thirteen and sixteen named storms. Of those storms, between 8 and 10 would reach hurricane strength and four to six would go on to become major hurricanes.

Remember that these are only hurricane predictions. However, those living in along the coast should always take precautions and be prepared in case of a hurricane hits
Having lived and worked in the New Orleams area for a number of years in the mid to late '70's, one cannot ignore the effect of local politics on New orleans flood control. Year after year local taxes that were to be utilized for maintenance of the pump stations were diverted to pork projects, and, quite frankly, to the pocket of politicians. I have also lived abroad for a number of years, and the political structure of New Orleans is at best, Third World. It was all bound to fail...
thanks patrap.....looks like a active season.. sorta like 2004.
when will the updated predictions be released? I herd april 5th for TSR. not sure about colorado state.
When they let dem TSRs suckas loose.Im sure they will be posted here in minutes..
Jazz fest Schedule and Performers...
The 70s ended 27 years ago...
Nooo Sheafe, not in Louisiana, it didn't happen like that. The levee districts are there the help us. Someone should go interview our old Gov. while he is still behind bars.

You know someone has to burn for this. Its a shame the real ones at fault will never share any of that fiat. Nor do they feel any remorse I suspect.
What was the offical surge hieght of Katrina in New Orleans?
Good evening i was just wondering if any of the models are still pridiction for a low to form north of the carribean. That same area has persisted there for days...
Posted By: cyclonebuster at 10:15 PM GMT on March 23, 2007.

How about the NW Carribean Sea? Any chance?

NW carribean: Best chance for a true tropical system.

Mid atlantic system: Best chance for subtropical development.

Mid atlantic system: Best chance for any development.

Chance for any development: Low.

Chance for a nasty hurricaine season: High.
i meant north of the bahamas
Basically, I see a lot of favorable conditons forming early. Whether these will persist remains to be seen.
Skyepony, it was 10-14 feet. NOLA was on the west side of the storm. Surge in Waveland, MS area was 28'+. I would imagine that surge in St. Bernard Parish east of NOLA was over 20', as well as Plaquemines Parish, south of NOLA, where the storm first made landfall. (besides FL)
Western Australia (Perth)
Bureau of Meteorology

Tropical Low
16.0S 120.8E - 25 knots 1004 hPa

wind gusts up to 45 knots

Tropical Cyclone Advice #1
===========================
A Tropical Low was estimated to be 265 km northwest of Broome and 535 km north northeast of Port Hedland, moving west at 9 knots.

The low may develop into a tropical cyclone late on Sunday or on Monday. It is expected to continue heading west overnight and early Sunday but is likely to recurve towards the coast later on Sunday or on Monday. Gales are not expected on the coast on Sunday but could develop on Monday.

Tropical Cyclone Watch and Warnings
=======================================
A CYCLONE WATCH has been declared for a developing tropical low for coastal areas from Onslow to Cape Leveque.


Note: this regards to 92S.INVEST in the Southeastern Indian Ocean
More From The Times-Picayune | Subscribe To The Times-Picayune
T-P staffers who file can't cover corps
Friday, March 23, 2007
From staff reports

The Army Corps of Engineers is not the only organization that had to decide what to do when its employees filed claims letting them sue over Hurricane Katrina damage.

Jim Amoss, the editor of The Times-Picayune, this week decided that newsroom employees who filed the claims will not be involved in covering the agency. Newsroom staffers who withdraw their claims will be allowed to cover the agency.

The forms were due by March 1, and corps officials said Thursday that they are only halfway finished sorting through them. Already, they have counted tens of thousands of forms, and the claims reviewed so far have totaled more than $400 billion.






Amoss said the desire of some of the news operation's roughly 220 employees to seek damages from the corps is understandable. Many staff members lost their homes to flooding caused by the failures of the corps' flood protection system.

"To ensure journalistic credibility, it's important that we avoid any appearance of bias," Amoss said. "The perception of fairness would be compromised if journalists were involved in corps coverage while they also pursued a legal case against the agency."

Amoss, whose home suffered minor flood damage, said he did not file the claim form. He said the newspaper is determining how many journalists filed the forms and how many will choose to withdraw. Because the corps is involved in so many aspects of the civic life of Louisiana, especially since the flooding, he said that some members of the staff may have to be reassigned if they continue to pursue the suit.

"We understand that citizens, including our staffers, have a right to make this claim," Amoss said. "While respecting that right, we have to separate it from our duties as journalists."

Amoss' decision does not affect employees of other departments at the newspaper
Animation of the Katrina surge and how the breaches occurred..Link
New Orleans District Task Force - Contact Us
Design Built Institute of America Presentation (this presentation may take 2-3 min. to open). Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) Summaries..//\\\ Link
24hr live webcam of New Floodgate Structure.. Corps Of Engineers construction at New London Outfall Canal..Same as going on at 17th St Canal..Link
Sheafe -

There was a plan proposed in the late 90s to combine environmental restoration and protection renovations - major overhaul of the levee system and reconfiguration of the canals to help restore wetlands and natural storm surge barriers. It was written up in National Geographic, promoted by numerous environmental groups and actively supported by the Corps. But it was to cost $15 billion over five years and the majority in Congress consistently rejected the appropriation, calling it way too expensive - an ounce of prevention and all that. BTW - the $15b plan would have cost the average taxpayer about six bucks a year out-of-pocket. Think about ow much more it's going to cost us all now.

The tax cuts of 2001 and then 9/11 appeared to kill the proposal, but it was brought up again in 2003-04. I lobbied my Senators and Reps hard to support the plan (and I live in Maine), framing it as a Homeland Security issue - protecting he infrastructure of a critical port - but nobody signed on. Again, it was "too expensive."
Pic courtesty aquak9 of Lake side of New Floodgate at the 17h St Canal entrance.This structure will close and prevent the Lake Ponchatrain Surge from Entering the Canal and Breaking the walls....there was no structure here for Katrina ,or the other 2 Outfall canals either.New London and Orleans.8
The pumps you here that were defective were installed here.But those pumps have been refitted by the manufactuers and are now nearing completion.These pumps take RAINwater that accumulates during the storm and pumps it out of the Canals..and INTO the Lake to keep the Hoods from flooding ..and keep that STRESS off the Canal walls.
Hopefully.Because the system can only move so much water per minute.If a slow Moving Thingee comes and lingers..Trouble could come again.
G morning sxwarren.
Thats a good brief on how ALL that went down.Thanks for the input.
Fly around of the 17th St. Canal Floodgates with Pumps,Pipes and other engineering stuff.Lake is to Right in first view.
Heres Your Link CB..Link
But it won't be a pretty story at the 17th and London canals, where powerful Orleans Sewerage & Water Board pumps are capable - under ideal conditions - of pumping water out at 10,000 cfs and 7,000 cfs, respectively..."there ya Go CB..CFS, cubic feet per second is the way they measure water movement volume.
Aerial view from Aug 30th 2005,..the New Structure in now to the right of the Canal Bridge..click to enlarge..Link
Investigations into the breach

On 10 November 2005, an article in the Times-Picayune revealed that sonar soundings discovered that the steel sheet pilings of the levee floodwall were 7 feet less deep than engineering specifications. Sample pilings pulled up were found to be of the length specified in the design, but it was then revealed that this length was less than the actual depth of the canal, in retrospect an obvious engineering mistake. Current analysis strongly suggests that the catastrophic breach was due to faulty design, rather than storm and water conditions more severe than the levee and storm wall system of the canal was intended to survive.

It also became public knowledge that homes in the area near what would become the breach were expericing problems with flooding in their yards from seepage from the canal, which they repeatedly reported. The Orleans Levee Board and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who share responsibility for the levees, stated afterwards that they had been unaware of this.

Further investigations have confirmed that the canal floodwall failed catastrophically at significantly lower water level than the top of the floodwall due to faulty engineering. The Metairie side of the Canal was no better built the Orleans side, and portions of the floodwalls showed signs of displacement; the Metairie side could have experienced similar failure if pressure on the canal had not been relieved by the failure on the Orleans side
Further investigations have confirmed that the canal floodwall failed catastrophically at significantly lower water level than the top of the floodwall due to faulty engineering. The Metairie side of the Canal was no better built the Orleans side, and portions of the floodwalls showed signs of displacement; the Metairie side could have experienced similar failure if pressure on the canal had not been relieved by the failure on the Orleans side
Metairie to the left..the intact side.. the floodwall has shown stress in areas from the event August29th 2005.Orleans to the right..This pic around Sept 12th.6
Patrap,
You probably already know this, but the old reliable pumps were designed by Low Lift pumps in my home town of Welsh,LA. At least, that's what I've always been told.
If you stand on the top..and walk.One can see the defects in alignment in areas.Small..but noticeable.
I believe those screw pumps were made there.Thats a good side story cajunkid.
Sure did CB.Those f-18 pics were cool.
To study and research the Pumping capacity of this area is a great engineering project for High school or even College students.
The delemma,..and engineering problem CB is to keep the water out.Hopefully that can be the forum.Those are Dam impellars.Thats a whole different thing.
There were numerous warnings for years before Katrina. Any number of Corps activities made the situation worse - cutting channels through the marshes, denying the marshland its sediment replenishment by channelizing the river, depleting the aquifer leading to increased subsidence of the city.

Basically we have seen the results of hubris on the part of engineers. They seem to believe that they can CONTROL nature rather than working WITH nature.

This is not limited to NOLA - we see in on the Mississippi River (remember the massive floods and levee failures in the Midwest) and even on creeks in little Sedgwick County, Kansas. Rather than trying to 'rein in' nature we need to learn to understand how nature works and then work with nature.

There is a reason we call it a FLOOD PLAIN!
I wonder how much discussion in court the lawyers will put up that this wasn't the surge of a typical Cat 3 hurricane.

NWS Cat 3 definition~
Catagory Three Hurricane
Extensive Hurricane. Winds of 97-113 knots (111-130mph). Minimum surface pressure is between 964-945mb. Storm surge of 9-12 feet.

Even in NO it made it a few feet above this. A direct cat 3 strike, with cat 3 surge probibly wouldn't have drown the city as it would have been much lower than this by the time it made it to NO.
A redux..
.Some Mercy Now..
Its getting better all the Time..
Good link on Supercells,Tornadoes and shear..lotsa animations. Link
New London Canal Floodgate with Lake Ponchatrain in view..Live webcam. Link
This is the Floodgate in the link below..Lake is to the right.
If you folks could see how seriously and conscientiously all levels of government take flood control in northern Europe, you'd be amazed.

In my view the Army Corps of Engineers should be stripped of the responsibility to manage the levee system in NO, and a separate dedicated and fully funded organization should be given that job.


Louisiana and the Netherlands:
A Friendship Forged by Water

January 9 - 13, 2006

From January 9 through 13, 2006, U.S. Senator Mary L. Landrieu, D-La., will lead a delegation of more than 40 Louisiana leaders and experts to the Netherlands as part of an educational exchange to discuss the many shared storm and flood protection challeneges Louisiana and the Netherlands face. The delegation includes Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, D-La., Senator David Vitter, R-La., Rep. William Jefferson, D-New Orleans, and other local officials, engineers, scholars.

Throughout the week, Sen. Landrieu will be sharing the delegation's visit to the Netherlands with everyone through this website. Look for daily updates about what the delegation has seen and learned from their journey.

Louisiana Delegation Tours Netherlands' World Class Flood Protection System

Senators Landrieu and Vitter Meet with Dutch Water Experts

January 12, 2006

The Louisiana Delegation saw first hand the world's largest and most advanced flood protection system, as part of an educational exchange to discuss the many shared storm and flood protection challenges Louisiana and the Netherlands face. The tour included stops at the two cornerstones of the Dutch system, the Maeslant Barrier and the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier, plus briefings from some of the world's leading experts in water management. The delegation also met with His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, who, in addition to being the Crown Prince of the Netherlands, is a world-renowned water management expert.

"It is possible to keep your feet dry, even living below sea level," said U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, who is leading the 40+ person delegation. Members of the delegation include Senator David Vitter, R-La., and other local officials, engineers, scholars.

"Sharing knowledge and expertise is an important condition for success," said His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Orange. "We will never be able to eliminate flooding completely. But being well-prepared can minimize the impact. In other words: you cannot control the wind, but you can adjust your sails. And that is what I hope for your delegation; that you will find plenty of inspiration here in the Netherlands to adjust your sails, on your voyage to a safer future."

The delegation also toured the WL Delft Hydraulics where they saw a demonstration of the Flood Early Warning System. The also discussed ways to strengthen Louisiana's storm defense and water management systems with leaders from the Regional Water Authority Delfland and Rijkswaterstaat, a division of the Ministry of Traffic and Water Management.

"Two things are very striking about your water boards. First, they are organized on a regional basis around natural drainage areas, and secondly, very importantly, there is an enormous professionalism and expertise built into them, which quite frankly we need to increase dramatically in at least some of our levee boards." said Sen. Vitter. "So there is one perfect example tied right to where we are sitting about what we will take back to Louisiana and immediately put into our debate."

In 1953, a North Sea storm plowed into the Netherlands, breaching dikes in more than 450 places and destroying nearly 50,000 homes and other buildings. Nearly 1,900 people were killed. The government responded with a 40-year program to increase the Netherlands' storm and flood protection through an elaborate network of dikes, man-made islands and 1-mile stretch of 62 floodgates designed to protect the country from North Sea storms likely to occur only once every 10,000 years. By comparison, while the weakest parts of the Dutch system protect inland areas from one-every-1,250-years flooding, Louisiana's strongest systems are only rated to a Category 3 level - or a 250-year storm.

In November, Boudewijn J. van Eenennaam, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States, traveled to South Louisiana with Sen. Landrieu where he saw firsthand the destruction caused by the Hurricanes and the failure of the storm protection system. He joined the Louisiana delegation during their tour of the Netherlands' flood protection system, and offered the following parting advice.

"The main essence of this visit is to convey that we were able, under more or less the same circumstances, to rebuild our country, and that sends the message to your people at home that you can do it," said Ambassador van Eenennaam.

Louisiana Delegation Arrives in Netherlands

Senators Landrieu and Vitter, Governor Blanco, Congressman Jefferson meet key Dutch Officials before Touring World-Class Storm Protection System

January 10, 2006

The Louisiana Delegation arrived in the Netherlands today to take part in an educational exchange to discuss the many shared storm and flood protection challenges Louisiana and the Netherlands face. After arriving, the delegation met with key members of the Dutch government to discuss that nation's water policy and to preview the upcoming week.

"We are here to learn and to understand, what we need to do to protect our people, not just from the next hurricane season, but from ever flooding in a catastrophic way again," said U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu, who is leading the 40+ person delegation. Members of the delegation include Senator David Vitter, R-La., Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, D-La., Rep. William Jefferson, D-New Orleans, and other local officials, engineers, scholars.

The delegation was welcomed by Melanie Schultz van Haegen, Vice Minister for Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Vice Minister Schultz van Haegen then led a series of briefings and seminars on her nation's flood protection system and water policies as a preview to tomorrow's agenda, which will include visits to the Maeslant Barrier and the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier, two pieces of the world's most advanced flood protection system.

"We had a very good meeting between the Netherlands and the U.S.," said Minister Schultz van Haegen. "We both want to know what we can learn from each other. We don't only want to show our experience and our systems to protect from flooding, but we are also curious what we can learn from the situation in New Orleans."

"A lot of people back home in Louisiana are focused on this trip and this discussion in terms of engineering issues and engineering solutions, but I think it will be even more valuable in terms of the much more difficult problems of governance, politics, organization, tradeoffs, environmental issues, finance, because those are the really tough nuts to crack," said Sen. Vitter.

"We want to look at your systems. We want to glean from the knowledge that you have acquired, from the experiences that you have shared, that are in many ways are similar to our own," said Gov. Blanco.

The delegation also met with members of the Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) today. The NWP is an independent body set up jointly by the Dutch private and public sector to act as a focal point for the exchange of information related to activities and services of government bodies, knowledge and research institutes and businesses involved in the water sector.

In 1953, a North Sea storm plowed into the Netherlands, breaching dikes in more than 450 places and destroying nearly 50,000 homes and other buildings. Nearly 1,900 people were killed. The government responded with a 40-year program to increase the Netherlands' storm and flood protection through an elaborate network of dikes, man-made islands and 1-mile stretch of 62 floodgates designed to protect the country from North Sea storms likely to occur only once every 10,000 years. By comparison, while the weakest parts of the Dutch system protect inland areas from one-every-1,250-years flooding, Louisiana's strongest systems are only rated to a Category 3 level - or a 250-year storm.

In November, Boudewijn J. van Eenennaam, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States, traveled to South Louisiana with Sen. Landrieu where he saw firsthand the destruction caused by the Hurricanes and the failure of the storm protection system.

Senator Landrieu Leads Official Trip to Netherlands To Study World-Class Flood Protection System

January 9, 2006

U.S. Sen. Mary Landrieu, D-La., will lead a delegation of more than 40 Louisiana leaders and experts to the Netherlands next week as part of an educational exchange to discuss the many shared storm and flood protection challenges Louisiana and the Netherlands face. The delegation includes Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, D-La., Senator David Vitter, R-La., Rep. William Jefferson, D-New Orleans, and other local officials, engineers, scholars.

"When the unprecedented disasters of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and the subsequent levee breaks struck Louisiana, the Netherlands was one of the first nations to come forward to offer their support," Sen. Landrieu said. "The Dutch know all too well the challenges we face, having lived for centuries under the threat from similar vulnerability themselves."

In 1953, a North Sea storm plowed into the Netherlands, breaching dikes in more than 450 places and destroying nearly 50,000 homes and other buildings. Nearly 1,900 people were killed. The government responded with a 40-year program to increase the Netherlands' storm and flood protection through an elaborate network of dikes, man-made islands and 1-mile stretch of 62 floodgates designed to protect the country from North Sea storms likely to occur only once every 10,000 years. By comparison, while the weakest parts of the Dutch system protect inland areas from one-every-1,250-years flooding, Louisiana's strongest systems are only rated to a Category 3 level - or a 250-year storm.

In November, Boudewijn J. van Eenennaam, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States, traveled to South Louisiana with Sen. Landrieu where he saw firsthand the destruction caused by the Hurricanes and the failure of the storm protection system.

While in the Netherlands they will meet that nation's leading engineers and storm protection specialists, tour the world's largest levee system, and meet privately with His Royal Highness Crown Prince Willem-Alexander.

"The Dutch recognize that 'homeland security' includes developing a comprehensive storm and flood protection strategy that not only protects people and communities, but also respects a vital harmony with the nation's commerce needs," Sen. Landrieu said, referring to the Port of Rotterdam - Europe's largest port, and the second largest in the world. Similarly, Louisiana's port system is the U.S.'s largest.

"This is a friendship forged by water and our shared history of living with it. But this trip will give us an opportunity to do more than just strengthen a friendship - Louisiana's future will be will strengthened from the information we gather and the lessons we learn.
Senators Landrieu and Vitter Meet with Dutch Water Experts4
Excellent report, Dr. Masters. Thank you. Now, let me see. $400B for lawsuits, $200B in Katrina damage, not including economic loss for a hurricane that was downgraded to a cat.1 or 2 as it slipped around New Orleans, causing a fraction of the damage that the monster that was originally forecast to travel right over New Orleans. Who would have thought that damage estimates could be this high for just an average landfalling storm? Full force Katrina and what would the damage costs have been? $900B ? What happens when a 'Katrina' is a cat.5 into a major city?
Jeff,

Interesting blog. I think it really comes down to this, we should not build levees there to begin with, nature does not want us there and nature will rip down anything we try to build there as clearly demonstrated. How about a National Park there instreead, seems that is the way nature wanted it.

Jim
LMAO!...LOL!
hey does anyone have any links to see the temps of the past years without having to pay?
is it me or is really early for storms rolling off africa?
Low cloud channel..click to enlarge Link
I dont know, the Dutch have built a very effective and enduring levee system. Just needs to be properly engineered and maintained.
Strange how very little blame was put on the government of LA. What did they do for the last 30 or 40 years.
1) The Army Corps failed to follow the 1965 Congressional mandate to protect against the "most severe combination of meteorological conditions reasonably expected." This mandate specified a "1 in 100 year storm" that the New Orleans levee system must protect against, which was set as a Category 2 hurricane with winds of 107 mph. In 1972, the National Weather Service adjusted the expected "1 in 100 year storm" to be a Category 3 hurricane with 129 mph winds. This was adjusted again in 1979 to a Category 4 hurricane with 140 mph winds. The Army Corp never revised their protection plans based on these new estimates, despite their mandate to do so and their awareness of the requirement to do so.
2) The New Orleans levees were built 1-2 feet too low, because the Army Corps used elevation estimates taken in 1929 to design the levees. The city has sunk over the years, and was already 1.3-1.6 feet lower than the 1929 elevation estimates in 1965 when the levee system was designed. Continued subsidence of the land resulted in levees that were up to five feet too low when Katrina struck. The Corps was aware of the subsidence issue, but did not correct for it. The levees being too low caused many of the failures that flooded New Orleans, the report asserts: Crown elevation deficiencies ranging up to 5 feet at the time Katrina struck resulted in prolonged overtopping of floodwalls and levees along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) and to the east in the Lake Borgne funnel that otherwise would have been overtopped only briefly. Prolonged overtopping led to catastrophic breaches into the Lower 9th Ward on the east and into Orleans Metro on the west, and contributed to the early failures of levees along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW)and MRGO. Early failure of the MRGO levee allowed the 32,000 acre wetland buffer between MRGO and 40 Arpent back levee to fill and overtop the 40 Arpent back levee while the surge was still rising, and resulted in catastrophic flooding in St.Bernard to an elevation of 11 ft.

3) The Army Corp did not follow existing engineering practice and guidance for construction of levees and floodwalls.
The Army Corps yesterday issued a press release defending themselves, saying that all levels of government were involved in the poor decision making for New Orleans' levees, and the Corps should not be singled out for their failures. Regardless, the release of the Team Louisiana report will bolster the legal efforts to sue the Army Corps for damages from Katrina. These claims are currently at $400 billion and growing, including a claim of $77 billion from the city of New Orleans, and $200 billion from the state of Louisiana
Corps of Engineers ..In their own words,..Link
the Dutch have built a very effective and enduring levee system.

Right, but not until after this happened... unfortunately the U.S. didn't learn their lesson (Katrina was NOT the first storm to flood New Orleans):

The 8th storm formed south of Hispaniola on September 13. It reached hurricane strength south of Cuba, and eventually hit southern Louisiana as a Category 3 hurricane, making landfall at Berwick, Louisiana on 20 September with a 15 foot storm surge. It became known as the Grand Isle Hurricane, after its devastation of Grand Isle, Louisiana. Heading inland on a path in between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, it produced flooding in New Orleans in a pattern similar to that of Hurricane Katrina almost a century later, but low lying areas within the city limits at the time had little residential build up, the consequences of the flooding were much less severe than those of the more recent storm. It dissipated over Southern Missouri on September 22. This storm ranks as one of the deadliest to hit the U.S. with 350 being killed with damages estimated at over 5 million dollars (in 1909 dollars).


Katrina wasn't the only disaster that could have been stopped either....
Didn't the 1915 storm also flood New Orleans?
8mm footage of Betsys flooding in Chalmette,St Bernard Parish..1965 Link
Dunno Kris..im Only 47..
Thanks for the update Dr Masters. I agree that the Government needs an overhaul. Disasters such as Hurricane Katrina should be a number one priority for government response. And with a debt that large it's going to become harder and harder to give very large amounts of aid, creating many more stresses elswhere in the countries programs.

PEACE ON EARTH
Unfortunately, over the last 20 years, funding in the Corps was shifted from basic infrastructure and levee maintenance, to the restoration of "aquatic ecosystems." This may have affected New Orleans levees and possibly disasters to come.
17th St Canal Breach Repair area 1 year after failing to the hour...August 29th, 2006 8
August 29th 2006 Bell Ringing Remembrance..17th St. Canal...Reading of the Lost.

NYTimes.com

December 18, 2005
Louisiana's Deadly Storm Took Strong as Well as the Helpless
By SHAILA DEWAN and JANET ROBERTS
NEW ORLEANS - More than 100 of them drowned. Sixteen died trapped in attics. More than 40 died of heart failure or respiratory problems, including running out of oxygen. At least 65 died because help - shelter, water or a simple dose of insulin - came too late.

A study by The New York Times of more than 260 Louisianans who died during Hurricane Katrina or its aftermath found that almost all survived the height of the storm but died in the chaos and flooding that followed.

Of those who failed to heed evacuation orders, many were offered a ride or could have driven themselves out of danger - a finding that contrasts with earlier reports that victims were trapped by a lack of transportation. Most victims were 65 or older, but of those below that age, more than a quarter were ill or disabled.

The results are not necessarily representative of the 1,100 people who died in the storm-ravaged part of the state. The 268 deaths examined by The Times were not chosen through a scientific or random sample, but rather were selected on the basis of which family members could be reached, and which names had been released by state officials.

Nonetheless, the study represents the most comprehensive picture to date of the Louisiana victims of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent levee failures. The Times conducted more than 200 interviews with relatives, neighbors and friends of the victims, and culled information from local coroners and medical examiners, census data, obituaries, and news articles.

The interviews add narrative and nuance to what has been a largely anonymous or purely statistical casualty list. Relatives were able to explain that what might have been listed as a simple drowning was really a tragic end to a rescue, or that medical care just a few minutes earlier might have meant the difference between life and death.

In New Orleans almost three-quarters of the black victims examined by The Times and almost half the white victims lived in neighborhoods where the average income was below $43,000, the city's overall average. In New Orleans, the median income for whites is almost twice what it is for blacks. Many, if not most, were Louisiana natives, and virtually all were members of the working class - nurses, janitors, barbers, merchant marines.

Among them was Althea Lala, 76, who suffered a heart attack while trying to saw through her roof. Prosper Louis Flint, blind, diabetic and dehydrated, was one of at least 19 people who died in the hot sun on Interstate 10, according to the state health department, waiting for help to come. Donise Marie Davis, 28, fell to her death from the rope of a rescue helicopter. Todd Lopez, 42, pushed his girlfriend's family into an attic before the water overtook him. Paul Haynes, 78, told his wife, "Marge, don't worry about me. I know how to survive."

State officials have released the names of only 512 victims - fewer than half the estimated deaths in the state - and have provided just a skeletal demographic breakdown, showing that most were 65 or older, about half were black and about half were female. Despite repeated requests, neither state officials nor the coroner of Orleans Parish, where the bulk of the deaths occurred, have released causes of death, and Louisiana death certificates are not a matter of public record.

More than 60 families told The Times that they still did not know how or in some cases even where their loved ones perished. As a result, a full portrait remains impossible.

The Times's examination encompassed about 175 of the approximately 360 New Orleans residents so far identified, along with about 60 people who died in the surrounding parishes and about 50 evacuees. One in the group was the victim of a criminal homicide.

"It's ironic that you can survive a storm," but still die, said Velda Smith, who lost her sister-in-law and three teenage nieces to the floodwaters. On the day they drowned, she said, "everything was fine. The sun was shining." Then the Industrial Canal's levee broke, prompting a panicked call by one of her nieces to their father. The girls, Kendra and Kendricka Smooth and Doneika Lewis, were spending the night at their aunt Ersell Smooth's house on Flood Street in the devastated Ninth Ward.

"The girls were hysterical," Ms. Smith said. "The water was rising so fast. Then the phone went dead. They did not know how to swim." By the time their father got to his own front door, the water was already rising in his house. He, his wife and four other children made it to a neighbor's house and were airlifted to safety.

Because of bodies that washed away or have not yet been found, a full accounting of the dead may not be available for months or even years. But more than 1,400 victims from along the Gulf Coast have been counted, including some who evacuated and whose deaths may later be determined to be unrelated to the storm.

Bodies were found floating alongside refrigerators, wedged under furniture, lashed to telephone poles or covered by makeshift shrouds. School buses arrived at shelters with some of their passengers already dead. The deaths tell of individual stubbornness, helplessness and selflessness, shortsighted government policy, and the hardships of poverty, aging and disability.

Some victims became emblematic of the horror in New Orleans and the inefficiency of the government response. There was Vera Smith, whose improvised grave proclaimed, "Here lies Vera. God help us." Ethel Freeman, slumped in her wheelchair under a plaid blanket outside the convention center. Xavier Bowie, a lung cancer patient whose girlfriend cried over his body in the street. Alcede Jackson, who lay on his front porch, in full view, until Sept. 12, and still has not been released by the central morgue. And withered, frail Edgar Hollingsworth, 74, whose rescue more than two weeks after the hurricane provided a rare glimmer of good news. Two days later, he died.

For each of those, hundreds died in obscurity. In the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans, where a deadly wall of water surged down streets and swept houses off their foundations, Karnettia Jacko, 26, slipped from her husband's grasp and sank into the murky water, relatives said. Her mother, 51-year-old Brenda Andrews, grabbed for her daughter and fell in as well. As the rest of the family watched from the roof, their bodies bobbed to the surface.

In Lakeview, Yvette Pereira, 54, died in her attic hours after the Coast Guard called her cellphone to say they were in the neighborhood but could not locate the house. An hour later, her 11-year-old daughter, Alexandra, who had been by Ms. Pereira's side for two days, was rescued.

Vanessa Pereira, Alexandra's grown sister and, now, her caretaker, had been evacuated but used her cellphone to stay in contact with her mother during the ordeal and made dozens of calls to find help. "I was just telling them stuff like, 'She's having a heart attack. She's with an 11-year-old child, you can't let this happen,' " Vanessa Pereira said. "The rescue people that were talking to me were crying."

Ms. Pereira said she lost more than her mother and her home - she lost her "false sense of protection," the notion that the government would be there to help in a crisis.

While the state's list of victims shows that a vast majority died alone, 31 families in the Times study lost more than one member. Anna Bonono, 85 and sick with cancer, died with her 80-year-old brother and caretaker, Luke Bonono. Their house was destroyed. "The house had been the family home for years," Rosalie Bonono, a niece, said. "It's like this family has been erased because of one hurricane."

Water - rising as fast as a foot every 10 minutes - overtook many who thought the worst had passed. In St. Bernard Parish, just east of the city, Joan Emerson, 57, was on the phone with her son at midmorning on Monday when he heard her screaming, then the phone went dead, a family friend said. Her body was found 18 days later.

In Arabi, the St. Bernard town adjacent to the Lower Ninth Ward, the water came so fast that Kenneth Young did not have time to save his wife of 56 years, Gloria, who was partly paralyzed and bedridden, relatives said. He stayed with her until the last possible moment, watching her drown before he narrowly escaped to the attic, where the couple's daughter waited.

Of the 126 people who were not in a nursing home or hospital, yet did not evacuate, only 25 families said transportation was an issue - although there could be many more such victims, because the Times study was less likely to include the homeless or those with no driver's license or other official documents. Others said the victims refused to leave because they had survived earlier hurricanes, were worried about their property or pets, or were simply obstinate. At least one victim tried to leave town, got stuck in traffic, and returned home.

Clarence Fleming, 64, had two amputated legs, but still told each of his family members he was riding with someone else and stayed in his home in the Lakeview section of New Orleans. Hannah Polmer said her 64-year-old mother, Rachel Polmer, simply felt safest in her own home. "Elderly syndrome," the daughter called it. Not including hospital patients or nursing home residents, two-thirds of those who did not leave were over 60. Thirty were ill or disabled.

Many said that mandatory evacuation orders came too late, or that leaving, even with transportation, was not a simple matter for older residents. LeShawn Hains could not find a special-needs shelter for her mother, Gilda, who was on oxygen and had heart and lung trouble. Eddie Cherrie Jr. stayed behind with his mother, Onelia, who relied on a walker and blood pressure medication. "It's true nothing stopped us from leaving," he said. "But also, it's not that easy to leave with a 91-year-old woman."

They survived the storm but were later taken by helicopter to the airport, where officials separated a badly dehydrated Ms. Cherrie from her son, leaving her to die alone, he said. Mr. Cherrie said if the levees had not broken, she would have survived. "That's malfeasance," he said.

For many, routine maladies turned fatal. Melvin Alexie Jr., 47, developed a mastoid infection in his ear after the storm. His father took him to Charity Hospital, which he said was too overwhelmed to help. A trip to a Federal Emergency Management Agency center proved fruitless as well, and Mr. Alexie died on Sept. 13 in Gretna, a New Orleans suburb. Edward Starks, 58, ran out of insulin at the convention center, his aunt, Dorothy Guy, said.

For others, help simply came too late, according to relatives. Earl Balthazar, 72, slipped out of his life jacket and drowned just as help arrived. Eunice Breaux, who suffered from multiple sclerosis, was trapped with 15 other people on the third floor of a home. Five days after the storm, a boat finally came and dropped them off on a levee, where Ms. Breaux, 76, died. Her death certificate says she drowned, a finding her family disputes.

Many family members said that although their older relatives were nearing the end of their lives, they had the right to peaceful, dignified deaths.

Louis Orduna Sr., a decorated World War II veteran, was 90 but in great shape, said his nephew, Jack Bunn. "His son begged him to get out," Mr. Bunn said. "He refused to leave. He felt he'd be safe there - he had no idea."

The water was up to his roof within nine minutes of the levee break.

"Every tooth in his head, every hair on his head was still there," Mr. Bunn said. "To go like that, drowning like a rat, it's terrible. It's not the way an individual like that was supposed to go."

Shaila Dewan reported from New Orleans for this article, and Janet Roberts from New York. Reporting for this article was contributed by Lara Coger, Micah Cohen, Brenda Goodman, Lily Koppel and Lee Roberts. Research was provided by Donna Anderson, Jack Begg, Nick Bhasin, Happy Blitt, Alain Delaqu�ri�re, Sandra Jamison, Toby Lyles, Jack Styczynski, Carolyn Wilder and Margot Williams
In Lakeview, Yvette Pereira, 54, died in her attic hours after the Coast Guard called her cellphone to say they were in the neighborhood but could not locate the house. An hour later, her 11-year-old daughter, Alexandra, who had been by Ms. Pereira's side for two days, was rescued.

Vanessa Pereira, Alexandra's grown sister and, now, her caretaker, had been evacuated but used her cellphone to stay in contact with her mother during the ordeal and made dozens of calls to find help. "I was just telling them stuff like, 'She's having a heart attack. She's with an 11-year-old child, you can't let this happen,' " Vanessa Pereira said. "The rescue people that were talking to me were crying.
In case anyone cares, SSTs in the Gulf are already above last year's, which were above the year before. My thumb in the air sense is that the atmosphere here in NOLA is in a more normal weather pattern than last Spring, which was mostly cloudless and quite windy.

I joined the suit against the Army Corps of Engineers as well.
7More From The Times-Picayune | Subscribe To The Times-Picayune
Corps plan for storms gutted to studs
More workers, gear to brace city for worst
Sunday, March 25, 2007
By Sheila Grissett


If a storm threatens New Orleans this hurricane season, onetime Marine and current Army Corps of Engineers crane supervisor Troy Davis will walk away from his day job, say goodbye to his family north of Hammond and rush to the 17th Street Canal, the new front line in a war to save New Orleans from a Katrinalike catastrophe.

He knows that it could be a dicey post, but he doesn't want to be anywhere else if another storm blows in.

"This is my job, and all the guys on my team have the same outlook," said Davis, who has been with the corps for 15 years. "This is also sort of like military service. We're not going to turn our backs and leave a mission."






Davis would be senior man on an all-volunteer crew of four that the corps is counting on to stop Lake Pontchartrain from plunging into the canal again and lancing the city's heart.

They are skilled mechanics, equipment operators and laborers, each able to do the others' jobs. Together, they are expected to drop 11 massive floodgates across the canal, help keep new drainage pumps running, and troubleshoot the unexpected.

Comparable teams will be stationed at the London Avenue and Orleans Avenue canals, then ride out the storm in bunkers with foot-thick concrete walls that stand 12 feet above the water on both sides of each canal near its mouth. The flood defense is reinforced with high-tech information systems that include fail-safe communications gear and remote cameras to monitor gauges, engines and water levels creeping up levees, gates and floodwalls as a storm approaches.

The contrast with Hurricane Katrina couldn't be sharper.

As the storm passed and much of metropolitan New Orleans sank into watery ruin, there were no emergency personnel posted at the canals, no specific plan to confront a major break in federal hurricane defenses and no clear chain of command dictating which agency should lead the fight to stanch levee breaches.

In Katrina's aftermath, command of the 17th Street Canal was reduced to chaos as representatives of four levee districts, the corps and the state wrangled for authority to direct emergency repairs.

With dismally ineffective communications systems and the challenge of travel through the flooded region, 48 hours passed before a corps general and the state transportation chief could get to the site and settle the jurisdictional squabble by asserting federal authority. Consolidation of the state's fractious levee boards has gone a long way toward minimizing a repeat of that scenario. Next time, one person will speak for the consolidated levee districts east of the Mississippi River and another for those to the west, and both will answer to the state's transportation secretary, a member of the governor's Cabinet.

Extra hands on deck

Not only will fewer people be making early and critical decisions, there will be more personnel on hand to carry out orders.






Davis and cohorts are the front line in the city's flood defense, but by no means are they lone eagles.

Posted to their bunkers by the lake for all but Category 4 and 5 hurricanes, the corps volunteers will be quarterbacked by a canal "captain" berthed within the Orleans Sewerage & Water Board pump stations farther down each canal.

The corps' expanded disaster-preparedness plan is big on redundancy, both in terms of personnel and equipment stationed along a chain of command that stretches from the outfall canals to a corps bunker in New Orleans and another at Port Allen across the Mississippi River from Baton Rouge. Then there is the corps' headquarters at Vicksburg, Miss., which will direct emergency operations until command can be re-established closer to the storm strike zone.

The failsafe redundancy is nowhere more evident than in the multiple communications and monitoring systems now in place to help corps personnel maintain contact with one another and with outside agencies -- and to keep close tabs on water in the three canals.

A key function of those overlapping communications grids will be to monitor water levels, making sure they don't exceed the "safe" level established for each channel: a maximum 6 feet of surge at the 17th Street Canal, 4 feet at London and 8 feet at Orleans.

Depth is a critical consideration. Flow rate is another. When the gates are closed, the huge pumps nearer the city's heart must not outpace the smaller temporary pumps the corps is installing to move water from the canal mouths out into Lake Pontchartrain. The canal floodwalls might not tolerate the pressure of water churning for hours on end, engineers said.

In addition to on-site canal crews, key positions have been added to the "bunker team" that stays behind in New Orleans, said Col. Richard Wagenaar, the district commander who had only eight employees with him on the ground during Katrina. Wagenaar and his group operated from the corps' Emergency Operations Center, in the agency's multistory Leake Avenue office, then at the height of the storm moved to a nearby bunker on high ground adjacent to the river. One of three new positions on the bunker team is that of "battle captain," a high-level corps' engineer who will coordinate emergency responses.

In addition, the Coast Guard, whose search-and-rescue sorties saved thousands stranded by Katrina floodwaters, will assign a liaison to the bunker team. A third new position will be filled by a specialist in geographic information systems.

In another departure from past practice, Wagenaar said 15 to 20 corps leaders will hole up at the corps' Port Allen lock 80 miles northwest of New Orleans. From there, corps vessels can return the executive staff by water if land transportation becomes problematic.






During Katrina, all corps managers were evacuated, along with most other agency employees, to operate the district remotely from Vicksburg, about 200 miles away.

"Vicksburg was too far. We need to get a leadership group back here sooner as first responders," Wagenaar said.

Wagenaar said he also hopes to avoid most of the jurisdictional confusion that led to some tense exchanges on the 17th Street Canal after Katrina as multiple agencies jockeyed to fashion and execute a plan to close the floodwall breach that was allowing Lake Pontchartrain to fill the city's bowl-shaped middle.

"At the end of the day, all emergencies are local; the process is designed to work that way," Wagenaar said. Unless federal law is changed, he said, local agencies will continue to be first responders to levee system emergencies within their jurisdictions. If overwhelmed, the locals will request state aid, and if the state also is outgunned, a request for federal help will be answered.

"In my opinion, you don't want every disaster to immediately trigger martial law or federal involvement," Wagenaar said. "So there's always going to be some gray area, and the question becomes: Do I step in if I see that local and state resources aren't sufficient, or do I wait for a request?

"You will always have to make that decision on the fly," he said, because no two emergencies are identical. And although Wagenaar applauds the "heroic" work of local emergency responders to the 17th Street Canal breach -- especially West Jefferson Levee District employees who engaged in road building -- he said he welcomes the streamlined chain of command achieved through levee district consolidation.

"What is not streamlined is dealing with the Sewerage & Water Board. They don't seem to work for anybody," Wagenaar said. Port Allen, lock crews

Although posting about 20 upper-level engineers and managers at Port Allen is a post-Katrina innovation, the site has long been a staging ground for equipment, supplies and skilled workers. The corps dispatched these same assets from Port Allen to New Orleans after Katrina to work round-the-clock shifts operating heavy equipment and filling the sandbags dropped by helicopter into canal breaches.

Small crews also will be kept on the job at locks in Algiers, Harvey and the Industrial Canal, in case it is possible to release floodwater into the Mississippi River.






"At the time of Katrina, the river was very low, so there might have been a window of opportunity to open the gate and let some water out," said Chris Accardo, the corps' operation chief. "It didn't happen and, even if it had, it wouldn't have made that much difference in Katrina, but we always keep skeleton crews on, just in case."

So long as communications hold, lock personnel can also provide critical eyewitness accounts of storm conditions.

"While I was in Vicksburg, I got a call from one of our guys stationed at the Industrial Canal lock, and he said water was going over the levees and into the neighborhood," Accardo recalled.

He said that account, coupled with the results of computer modeling that corps personnel was running, offered the first clue that catastrophe was in the wind.

"This was the first sign that this was going to be bad," he said. "So we knew it was going to be bad, but the big surprise to us was the failure of the outfall canals."

Equipment upgrades

If additional personnel are the meat of the corps' bulked-up storm plan, multiple communications systems are the bones. Corps personnel will carry State Police and Emergency Operations Center radios, as well as satellite phones, cell phones and Blackberries with out-of-state phone numbers that should stay in service if local cell towers go down. Backup communication systems and high-water vehicles also will be assigned to the corps members stationed as liaisons in the emergency operation centers of a dozen or so southeast Louisiana parishes -- another new level of post-Katrina positions.

The liaisons will give corps commanders a direct link to the local emergency preparedness officials, law enforcement and elected government officers who are housed or represented in the centers during storms.

"We'll have more people on the ground with (greater) ability to communicate" than during Katrina, said Wagenaar, who will take early retirement from the corps and leave his post July 20, a year short of the three years that district corps commanders of his rank usually serve.






Wagenaar declined to discuss his reasons for retiring early, but the upshot is that he will be handing off command on the eve of typically the nastiest stretch of any hurricane season. The most destructive storms to hit Gulf Coast states in the past 40 years -- Katrina, Andrew, Ivan, Camille and Betsy -- all struck during August and September.

But Wagenaar, who was on the job only 45 days when Katrina sideswiped New Orleans and leveled much of coastal Mississippi, said his departure wouldn't impair the corps' storm readiness.

"We are better prepared because of Katrina. You have some key leaders who went through Katrina as chiefs, and they're not going anywhere. They're going to be here for years," Wagenaar said, singling out Accardo and Chief Engineer Walter Baumy, co-authors of the new emergency plan. "You will have a solid core of expertise that remains here," Wagenaar said.

Canal walls now in plan

The New Orleans corps had a disaster preparedness and response playbook with the heft of a phone book when Katrina struck. But it was a general disaster plan that gave no special attention to the levees and floodwalls that would, in failing, doom much of New Orleans and parishes downriver.

Before Katrina, the corps had no reason to focus on a potential break in canal walls, Wagenaar said.

"In fact, the only discussion we had pre-K, during my 5 1/2 weeks on the job, was that a hurricane (that overtopped the system) could fill this city like a bathtub, and we'd have to de-water," he said. "There was never a discussion about levees or floodwalls being compromised." But he said the expanded plan treats the three canals and the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal area -- where closed-circuit cameras have been mounted on corps locks to help monitor conditions -- as the "centers of gravity."

Accardo said he couldn't have been more stunned by news of multiple, systemwide breaches.

"The idea of dropping sandbags by helicopter into breaches wasn't part of our plan. The thought of floodwalls breaching? Not something we had reason to consider," he said.






"We monitored water levels in Lake Pontchartrain, but not specifically at the outfall canals. Prior to Katrina, there was no historical information to suggest that the outfall canal walls were suspect and required intense water-level monitoring," he said.

Now there's lots of it, including the findings of scientists who estimate that most of the water that inundated New Orleans and several neighborhoods in northeast Jefferson Parish came through crevasses that in less than three hours had breached the three New Orleans outfall canals

"Obviously, Katrina has taught us many lessons, and the outfall canals will be intensely monitored for future storm events," said Accardo, a Metairie native whose duties now include operating the new floodgates and the temporary pumps that will help push water over them while closed.

Exacting instructions for operating gates and temporary pumps at the three outfall canals fill some 100 pages, and the canals themselves have been lined with a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA, system that uses sensors to transmit a wealth of information via computer screens, including changes in water levels along the length of all canals.

It is the SCADA inside the pump stations that canal captains will monitor as they synchronize the pumps near the gates and the bigger city pumps situated hundreds of yards -- sometimes a mile or more -- closer to the heart of the city.

With the gates closed against a surge, city operators must power down their stronger pumps to keep from overwhelming the lower capacity of the dozens of pumps set up at the mouths of the outfall canals. It is the pump operators who will make adjustments in response to information the canal captains collect from SCADA readings, Wagenaar said.

So critical is SCADA to protection of the canals that there are special backup generators in the pump houses just to keep the data system running. In addition, fiber optic cables backed up by a microwave system have been installed to keep SCADA data flowing as long as possible to pump stations and to the corps' riverfront headquarters and emergency bunker. Show time

The corps calls it T-5: the point, five days out, at which metropolitan New Orleans appears within the cone of a storm's possible landfall, as tracked by the National Hurricane Center.

The corps will activate its emergency operations at T-5, or 120 hours from a potential landfall, and the hydrology and hydraulics specialists working there will begin assessing computer models that project surge, wind and rainfall conditions.






At the same time, the canal crews responsible for lowering the floodgates and for helping run the corps' temporary pumps will be alerted and put on standby, as will be helicopter contractors who might need to transport canal crew members and other emergency personnel to New Orleans, including divers who might be needed to clear debris or silt from the gates prior to closing.

If the New Orleans area is still in the cone of uncertainty 24 hours later, at T-96, the canal teams will be activated and preparations for closing the gates will begin. On site, team members will review procedures and verify that all tools, fuel, equipment, and safety provisions are in position.

Simultaneously, the corps will activate helicopter companies under contract to provide air transportation to the corps after storms.

Helicopters were in such high demand as rescue vehicles after Katrina that Wagenaar was unable to get into the air for an aerial survey of damage until sometime after 9 p.m. on Monday, Aug. 29, about 15 hours after Katrina made landfall.

Next time, the corps' district commander will be airborne in a Coast Guard chopper immediately after the storm passes.

In addition, commercial choppers are also under contract to help the corps make emergency repairs.

"One of the biggest problems after Katrina is that we couldn't get marine-based equipment to the breaches because of bridges," Accardo said. "But we couldn't get all the helicopters we needed because they were, understandably, running off to do search and rescue. "At 2 a.m., I got a call from a guy in Denver who said he could supply two Russian helicopters able to lift a phenomenal amount of weight, but they would cost $100,000 a day," Accardo said. "Col. Wagenaar told me to get them if I could . . . That was the mind-set: Do anything possible to get the resources needed." Ultimately, the Russian choppers ran into customs problems and were not brought to New Orleans.

Like the canal teams and helicopter companies, the corps' dive teams also will be put on standby at T-96. Although the time to prepare could be reduced by unexpected changes in a storm track, the goal is to have all preparation and testing complete by T-36, the point at which the district commander, in consultation with the chiefs of emergency operations and hydrology and hydraulics, will decide whether to close gates in the three outfall canals.

Timing varies on gates






Wagenaar said the corps will follow a communications matrix to ensure that local and state officials are kept informed at all critical junctions, including gate closings.

The gates might not all be closed at once, depending on the risk of high water surging in from the lake.

"There are procedures, but there is no set answer for when the gates come down because it will be based on variables at each canal," Wagenaar said. "I may close six of the gates to hedge my bet and leave five others open for drainage."

The disaster plan calls for Wagenaar or his successor to be on the London Avenue Canal, where the decision to close is so critical because of the low safe-water level. From there, they will move to the 17th Street Canal.

As storm conditions worsen, the commander and operations chief will move back to the corps' riverfront Emergency Operations Center. The canal captains will be inside the pump stations, and canal crews will take refuge in bunker-type structures built at the end of equipment platforms on each side of the canal's mouth.

"It could be bad out there, but it's a massive building, and I don't foresee that a storm could take that structure away," Davis said.

In addition to sheltering the workers, two each east and west of the canals, the small buildings also hold sensitive electronics equipment within foot-thick concrete walls. The shelter floors are about 12 feet off the ground, and each will have flatboats, safety gear and provisions. Accardo said the dozen crew members volunteered for service on the canals and were selected not only because of their skills, but their character.

"We couldn't have better people out there to do these jobs," he said.

Category 4 or 5


Accardo said many of the volunteers have no children or have families living well away from New Orleans that won't be in harm's way.

"We'll force people to do the jobs that need doing if we have to, but we much prefer volunteers," he said. "The truth is, we wanted people who wanted to be in the fight, and we got them."

If the area is threatened by a Category 4 or 5 storm, the men probably would be pulled off site once the gates were down and the pumps running. They would return as soon as possible after the storm passed, Accardo said.

"Why have them in harm's way? These aren't really safe houses in the sense that Jefferson Parish is building safe houses," he said. "These are equipment houses designed to handle a hurricane, but not a major storm surge.

"And if you think about it, the more intense the storm, the longer it will be before the gates can come up, so the less important it would be to have the men on site," Accardo said. "In fact, it may be more important to have them here for tropical storms, because they can get the gates up sooner
Not to take anyone away from the topic, but has Dr. Gray come out with anymore thoughts or ideas on wha this years hurricane season will be like?
http://hurricane.atmos.colostate.edu/Forecasts/2006/dec2006/

I do believe this is his complete report.
Posted By: plywoodstatenative at 3:08 PM EDT on March 25, 2007.

Not to take anyone away from the topic, but has Dr. Gray come out with anymore thoughts or ideas on wha this years hurricane season will be like?

New update comes out Tuesday april 3.

Can be found here.
No,I haven't heard anything from him.I suspect he'll probably increase his forecast,though.
274. 882MB
Hey everybody, Iam forward towards hearing from the DR. Really expect him to increase his numbers, Have you seen the CARRIBEAN ITS FULL OF MOIUSTURE,COMPARED TO LAST YEAR BEING DRY!AND IT LOOKS ACTIVE WITH THE ITCZ OVER COLOMBIA AND VENENZUELA MOVING SLOWLY NOTHWARDS DURING HURRICANE SEASON I EXPECT IT TO BE OVER THE CARRIBEAN!
Hey where's everyone tonight?
Tropical Depression 13F
12.5S 161.0E - 30 knots 997 hPa

Tropical Depression is moving east at 10 knots.

Tropical Disturbance Summary
=============================
Overall organization has improved past 12 hours. Wind shear is minimum over the system as well as to east with the outflow developing to the south but restricted elsewhere.

The potential for Tropical Depression 13 to develop into a tropical cyclone is moderate.
Is the weather this year at this time really different then it normally is? My dad tells me that it is always like this at this time of year...He is 70 years old and has always lived in S. Louisiana and has always paid attention...My husband tells me that this is normal weather and he should know, he is a big hunter and fisherman...I just don't know, up until Katrina...well, I never paid attention and last year went by so fast, I can't remember what the weather was like at this time of year...
its been raining here, in Trinidad, today we got 17 mm , and 23 mm overall since Thursday. Not a lot, but unusual for this time of year for sure. Lots of moisture still around too, and the forecast is for showers this week. Good news for me !!!!!!
Posted By: 882MB at 11:13 PM GMT on March 25, 2007.

Hey everybody, Iam forward towards hearing from the DR. Really expect him to increase his numbers, Have you seen the CARRIBEAN ITS FULL OF MOIUSTURE,COMPARED TO LAST YEAR BEING DRY!AND IT LOOKS ACTIVE WITH THE ITCZ OVER COLOMBIA AND VENENZUELA MOVING SLOWLY NOTHWARDS DURING HURRICANE SEASON I EXPECT IT TO BE OVER THE CARRIBEAN!


882MB... I dont' think that is possible. Then again, I could be wrong. I'm no specialist or anything.
I think at one point in '05, tropical moisture was being funneled all the way up to North Carolina. I'm not sure if it was the ITCZ, though!
CB, that's a nice low level circulation of Cuba, but it's being sheared to smithereens. Take another look and you'll see that the tops of the clouds are being ripped off and taken rapidly eastward.

That's shear. And its going to eliminate any chance of development in this system.

I admit, it does look ominous, though. If the shear was forecast to relax, I'd be concerned.
Just to mention: Pretty much the whole Atlantic is seriously sheared now, as it is much of the winter. When strong cold fronts stop digging far south, that's when you should start looking for development. Judging from the weather here in Ohio, it appears that may be starting to happen... but we're not there just yet.
In lieu of Dr. Gray's prediction I thought I'd post this one that just came out.
Forecaster expects very active hurricane season
17 storms, 9 of them hurricanes, predicted in Atlantic by private group
INTERACTIVE

Most viewed on MSNBC.com

Updated: 5:57 p.m. ET March 21, 2007
MIAMI - The Atlantic hurricane season will be exceptionally active this year, according to a British forecasting group, raising the possibility that killer storms like Hurricane Katrina could again threaten the United States.

London-based forecaster Tropical Storm Risk on Tuesday said the six-month season, which begins on June 1, was expected to bring 17 tropical storms, of which nine will strengthen into hurricanes with winds of at least 74 miles per hour.

Four of those are expected to become more destructive "intense" hurricanes, TSR said.
The long-term average for the Atlantic is for 10 storms to form during the hurricane season and for six of those to reach hurricane strength.

The United States emerged unscathed from the 2006 season after it spawned a below-average nine storms, of which five became hurricanes. Experts had universally and erroneously predicted 2006 would be a busy year for Atlantic storms.

None of the hurricanes hit the United States, bringing welcome relief to beleaguered residents of the U.S. Gulf Coast, where Katrina killed 1,500 people, swamped New Orleans and caused about $80 billion in damage the year before.

But TSR said current and projected climate signals indicate that Atlantic basin and U.S. landfalling hurricane activity will be 75 percent above the 1950-2006 average in 2007.

TSR had predicted in December that Atlantic basin and U.S. landfalling hurricane activity would be just 60 percent above average this year. It raised the projected activity level because of the sudden dissipation in February of last year's El Nino weather phenomenon.

An unusual warming of the eastern Pacific waters, El Nino events tend to suppress Atlantic storm activity.

Other experts, including hurricane forecast pioneer Dr. William Gray and his team at Colorado State University, have also warned that the 2007 hurricane season is likely to be busier-than-average.

The relative calm of last year's hurricane season, which forecasters had mistakenly predicted would be busy, came on the heels of a record 28 storms and 15 hurricanes in 2005 and only a slightly less furious season in 2004.

Severe Tropical Cyclone Kara now 80 knots (10 min) with gusts of 115 knots. The center pressure is 950 hPa and expected to increase to 90 knots (10 min) in 6 to 12 hours.
I have another point of a NYC landfall. A few folks have stated how it would be a thread the needle for a direct hit but I add this. As was seen with Katrina, you do not need a direct hit to cause massive flooding. Even with an eastward landfall (LI landfall) you have the entire Long Island Sound (aka Lake Ponchatrain) that would be blown westward into the East River and Jamica Bay thus flooding the entire East Side. As NY folks now a standard Nor'Easter floods the East Side Highway so imagine what even a mild Cat 2 would do? Also with the shape of the NY Bight water would first be pushed northward impacting into LI then as the windfield gets closer the wind shifts more northeast then east thus pushing the surge westward into the NY Harbor all the while the LI Sound begins its westward treck into the above mentioned rivers. Add in the foward speed and you have one heck of a time. Also it was mentioned about elevation and during the LI Express a 1 minute sustained 180mph wind speed at 600 feet, take a look at a majority of buildings in the NY area are 40 stories or more thus the 600 foot elevation would be a large factor. Also as I type this I look at Boston and realize the entire North East Corridor would be affected and look at all the infastructure in that swath of area and the denisty of population and one can only imagine the effects of a landfall. Folks have mentioned major landfalls it would not take that even a strong cat 1 or mild cat 2 would absolutley devastate the area. Maybe not with complete loss of said infastructure but with loss of services due to wind damage, water inundation, loss of subway services, loss of rail service, electric untilites (most are above ground in the north east) and then factor in the attempt of evacuation and its impossiblity and you are looking at a major issue.

I have said it before and will reiterate my previous statments that any storm regardless of size or intesity that affects an individual is the worst case scenario but looking at the big picture any landfall in the NY area would have repructions felt throughout the country, especially the eastern seaboard.

Lets hope this never happens.
hey guys good morning kinda off topic wondering what the condition of city park is these days concidering a wedding in your beautiful city
If your meaning Central Park NYC this week looks to be georgious hitting upper 70s to 80 degrees tuesday then back into the 60s for the rest of the week.

As we exit winters grip the temps should moderate between 60 to 75 degrees most days upper 40s to 50s at night then as we get closer twords summer 70s and 80s daytime 50s and 60s at night. Twords the end of May look for 70s and 80s with lows in the 60s and 70s. Humidity starts to arrive around that time which can make for sticky days and nights.

After May summertime temps can run anywhere from 80s to 105. Night time can be as cool as 65 or as unpleasant as 75 humidity usually runs 50 to 60% most days with 90 and 100% happening frequently usually called a 3H day (Hazy, Hot, Humid)

These are just rough estimates as there are times we dont have a spring (cool temps right up till June) then the temps spike high and saty that way) other times we have a smooth transition (as is happening now).
Another dud storm today for So Cal. What els is new this season? I am sounding like an old broken record but its the truth. Tonight mostly cloudly equal chances for a rain shower and a slight chance of a thunderstorm. Most of the rain/thunderstorms staying just north of the area. Rain totals less then 0.25 inches. Very windy in deserts and mountains.

There isnt much to look
lightning10 hopefully with a cool down and possible La Nina you will start seeing monsoon moisture arrive in SoCal.
Remember this song by Leon Everett, popular about 1981?

HURRICANE

Leon Everett

Thirty miles out in the Gulfstream
I can hear those south winds moan
Bridges are looking lower
Shrimp boats hurrying home
The old man down in the quarter
Slowly turned his head
Took another sip of whiskey
He looked at me and said

CHORUS:
Well I was born in the rain by the Ponchartrain
Underneath that Louisiana moon
I don't mind the strain of a hurricane
When she comes 'round every June
High black water she's the devil's daughter
She's hard an' she's cold an' she's mean
Nobody taught her that it takes a lot of water
To wash away New Orleans

Man come down from Chicago
Gonna set that levee right
He said it's got to be three feet higher
Or it won't make it through the night
The old man down in the quarter
Said don't you listen to that boy
The water be down by morning
So he'll be on his way to Illinois.
sorry should have clarified no i ment city park in new orleans figured a couple of posters on here seem very close i am in florida and now sometimes recovery can be slow even without the hurdles they faced
PC I am in City Park every day, its slowly coming along.
nola70119 thank you think its ready for a small wedding? i love the old architure there and how is your weather this time of yeari am in florida so used to humid
planning around hurricane season is great lol heres to hoping they are wrong again and the gulf coast will get another unactive season (i am on the florida gulf coast)
296. Inyo
Posted By: Bonedog at 1:54 PM GMT on March 26, 2007.
lightning10 hopefully with a cool down and possible La Nina you will start seeing monsoon moisture arrive in SoCal.


Bonedog, is La Nina associated with increased monsoons? The summer monsoons of the past few years have been strong and a big help for the Sierras and the Mojave Desert but not much on the coast. I do know that La Nina can increase the fog along the coast which will help a little.

then again, the El Nino didn't make it wet so the La Nina might not make it foggy.
297. Inyo
also, when discussing worst case hurricane disasters, don't forget that there is precedence for catergory 1 hurricanes hitting Los Angeles or San Diego. The winds would not be a major issue but if such a storm were to move over the area slowly, torrential rains would be unleashed over the mountains and possibly flood much of the city. Probably not as bad as a major hurricane in NYC, but nevertheless, California is absolutely unprepared.