timbersfan's WunderBlog

The Best Bargains in the NBA
Posted by: timbersfan, 1:05 AM GMT on March 09, 2013 +0
When the Sacramento Kings were evaluated at $525 million recently, I wanted to stand up and applaud the 30 NBA owners like they'd just finished putting on The Book of Mormon or something.

Bravo, fellas! Bravo! You were great! BRAVO!

It seems like only yesterday when they were playing the panic card right before 2011's travesty of an NBA lockout kicked off. Their financial infrastructure was busted. (Or so they claimed.) Just about everyone was losing money. (Or so they claimed.) Things couldn't keep going the way they were going. (Or so they claimed.) They had to get player salaries under control, or else. (Or so they claimed.) And we bought it. All of it.

Here's what really happened. The owners knew that rights to live sporting events had become television's most important advertising commodity in the DVR Decade. They knew that their broadband business was exploding, that they might have as many as three other networks with 24-hour sports channels waiting for ESPN's TV contract to expire in 2016. They knew they had a waiting list of billionaires for their available franchises, as well as many of the most marketable superstars in all of professional sports under their domain. And they knew they needed to do a better job of "fixing" their year-to-year costs, which was the quickest way to increase the value of their franchises.

So they did what any smart businessmen would do. They played poker and fibbed about their hand. They made believe things were bleaker than they actually were. They pretended to be losing gobs of money — thanks to some creative accounting, of course — and pretended a slew of narcissistic rich dudes weren't dying to buy their teams. There's no better investment than an NBA team, by the way. The prices never go down. You don't have to put up THAT much money if you're a billionaire — maybe $150 million for a majority share, if that. You get to sit courtside 41 times a year and stroll around with your chest puffed out. You fly by private jet to every owners' meetings and every league event, measure yourself against your wealthy counterparts, maybe even feel a little validated as it's happening. And you can sell at any time. Not that you would. It's the ultimate ego purchase. You know, as long as you have the right team.

And that's what the lockout was really about. The league wanted all 30 franchises to mean something. They wanted to drive up everyone's collective value. They wanted to create a new world order in which Memphis or Minnesota could be sold just as easily as the Knicks or Clippers. Without major changes to their luxury tax system, without a shrinking salary cap, without shorter contracts, without better revenue sharing … the NBA just couldn't survive. (Or so they claimed.) So what if the Clippers were "evaluated" to be worth half of what Donald Sterling could actually get for them? So what if the Knicks were allegedly worth $1.1 billion when everyone knows you could offer James Dolan $3 billion for the Knicks, Rangers and Madison Square Garden and he'd hang up on you? That didn't fit their self-serving narrative. They needed us to believe that the NBA was in trouble.

The longer the lockout dragged on, the more we started to believe them. During that time, the National Basketball Players Association was being run by the one and only Billy Hunter, someone who took six months to negotiate the same deal that was sitting there in June. To say that Hunter didn't have the players' best interests in mind would be an understatement; it's going to take years, and probably a few lawsuits, to determine exactly how negligent he was. But you know what? Trying to line his family members' pockets was more shady than purely destructive; sheeeeeeeeeee-iiiiiiiiiiiiiit, that was just a bad Clay Davis impersonation. Giving the owners a 50 percent revenue share, shorter contracts AND significantly harsher luxury-tax penalties? That's a whole other story. He squandered just about any leverage the players had.

When it finally ended, the NBA only needed to toss away 16 regular-season games to flip the salary structure their way. You know who noticed immediately? Really wealthy smart people. People bought the Sixers, Warriors and Pistons even before the lockout finished playing out, anticipating what would (and did) happen because David Stern and Adam Silver were telling them what would (and did) happen. The Grizzlies and Hornets sold soon after the lockout ended for more than anyone ever imagined. Right now we have two groups fighting to overpay for the Kings, and once that plays out, somebody will probably overpay for the Timberwolves. Buying an NBA team these days is like buying beachfront property in Turks and Caicos — it barely matters where your house is, or what shape it's in, just that you're on the water.

But here's the catch …

By making tax penalties so much more potent, the league subtly changed the way basketball teams can be constructed. Already this season, we've seen two contenders willfully jeopardize their title chances for financial reasons. Oklahoma City traded James Harden because they couldn't afford his next contract. Memphis traded Rudy Gay because they couldn't afford his current contract. No matter how you felt about those two deals — personally, I hated the Harden trade, but didn't mind the Gay deal — let's at least agree that they had no correlation to anything that's happened in professional basketball before.

When Oakland traded Jose Canseco to Texas for financial reasons before the 1992 trade deadline, I remember Peter Gammons calling it a historic deal, even declaring that we'd remember it as the beginning of a new world order for baseball — the day a contender chose its long-term future over its immediate present. And he was right. Within a few years, those kinds of trades just became part of baseball, for better or worse (mostly worse). That seems to be where we're heading in the NBA, too. The cap/tax changes leave little room for error — a problem for NBA teams, since many of them specialize in the word "error" — and because of that, we think about players in terms of their contracts more than we ever did. Those dollar numbers are part of their résumé, no different than their points-per-game.

Bet on the wrong two guys and it might take years to recover, as any Orlando Magic fan will tell you. But if you don't bet on anyone, it might take years to recover as well … as any Dallas Mavericks fan who misses Tyson Chandler will tell you. It's all about what you're spending, and how you're spending it, and on whom, and for how long. Once upon a time, just drafting well, making smart signings and stockpiling good players was enough. Not anymore. And you can thank Billy Hunter for that one — during that frustrating lockout, he was about as useful as King Joffrey during the Battle of the Blackwater. Good riddance.

Anyway, I usually mention the best and worst contracts as sidebars in my annual NBA Trade Value column (running in March). This year? I'm blowing it out. Contracts are too important these days. Next week, we're doing the worst deals. Today, we're doing the best ones, which can be separated into five categories.

Category 1: Any lottery pick still on his rookie deal

You don't need me to explain that it's beneficial to have Kyrie Irving locked in at $11.4 million through 2014, with a team option for the next two years at another $17.2 million. Cleveland sucked, landed the first pick, drafted the right guy, and paid him rookie scale. We're skipping these guys because there's little to no ingenuity involved.

Category 2: Any other first-rounder on a rookie deal who stayed with that team

You know, killer bargains like Kenneth "Don't Ever Call Me Ken" Faried (4 years remaining, $8.6 million); Avery "If I Don't Make a First-Team All-Defense Someday, Just Assume Something Went Horribly Wrong" Bradley (3 years, $7.7 million); Jimmy "I'm Quietly Making Luol Deng Expendable for a Pau Gasol Trade This Summer" Butler (4 years, $7.6 million); Larry "Everything Is Better When I'm Involved, and I Mean Everything" Sanders (3 years, $9.3 million); Eric "Utah Will Regret Not Trading for Me" Bledsoe (3 years, $8 million); and even Festus "I Cost About One-Tenth What Biedrins and Bogut Cost Combined and I Might Be More Reliable" Ezeli (3 years, $3.2 million). Again, not enough ingenuity involved.

Category 3: Expiring deals

Sorry, Jarrett Jack ($5.58 million), David West ($10 million), J.J. Redick ($6.0 million), J.R. Smith ($2.8 million), Corey Brewer ($3.2 million), Matt Barnes ($1.23 million), Mike Dunleavy ($3.8 million), Paul Millsap ($8.6 million), J.J. Hickson ($4 million) and every other expiring contract — your deals are up in four months and many of you might get overpaid. Well, except for you, Nik Pekovic ($4.8 million). I'm not sure you can overpay someone who can take a punch like this.


Category 4: Any seemingly benevolent extension kicking in next season

Specifically, Serge Ibaka (next 4 years: $49 million), Ty Lawson (4 years, $48 million), Jrue Holiday ($44 million) and Stephen Curry (4 years: $44 million). All four deals looked steep and/or risky in October; four months later, they range from "well-priced" to "brilliant" thanks to the way all four elevated their games. But if you're wondering how these extensions occasionally could go wrong, click on this link. And cover your eyes if you're a Wizards fan.

Category 5: Cap-appealing assets that range from "Nice!" to "THAT'S ROBBERY!"

My favorite category because we're rewarding teams for either (a) snaring a free agent for less than he's worth, (b) trading for a young asset on his rookie deal, (c) locking someone up to an improbably cheap extension, (d) convincing a veteran star to take a massive discount, (e) convincing LeBron James to play for them, or (f) stealing a valuable asset in the second round (just about the most helpful move you can make in the Super-Strict Salary Cap Era).

Before we hit our best cap-appealing guys, let's rip through our Honorable Mentions.

Carlos Delfino (Rockets): 2 years, $6 million
He's always been a solid NBA swingman (2013: 39 percent 3FG), only nobody wanted him last summer before Dork Elvis begrudgingly stepped in while thinking to himself, I'm just going to keep stockpiling assets, and at some point, maybe I can parlay a few of them into a franchise scorer and a top-five lottery pick, even if this sounds totally insane and my staff thinks I might be popping hard-core meds. Every August, there's always one or two Delfinos still kicking around, which is what makes it so funny when teams spend so much money in July to lock up the same type of player.

Marcin Gortat (Suns): 2 years, $15 million
Robin Lopez (Hornets): 3 years, $15.4 million
Seems like a super-cheap price for Gortat … and then you watch him put up 11 points and eight boards in 30 minutes with a happy look on his face that seems to say, "I wish we could drink beer during NBA games, that would be awesome" as his team is getting killed by 20 … and then he doesn't seem so underpaid. Meanwhile, Lopez turned himself into a decent NBA center and extinguished all Frank Stallone/Stephen Baldwin/Ozzie Canseco black sheep brother jokes in the process. You'd rather have Lopez at $5 million than Gortat at $7.5 million at this point, although Gortat might be the starting center on the Needs a Change of Scenery All-Stars. Stay tuned.1

Kyle Singler (Pistons): 3 years, $3.13 million
I like this guy and can't totally explain it. Either he's going to end up being horribly overpaid by Joe Dumars (a.k.a. Jerebko-ed), or he's going to end up on the Spurs at some point, have a bunch of clutch moments, and make everyone say, "Dammit, they did it again!" It's a coin flip right now.

Kyle Lowry (Raptors): 2 years, $12 million
Seems like a terrific price on paper, but it's worth mentioning that (a) Memphis and Houston abruptly gave up on him, and (b) Toronto quietly shopped him before dealing Jose Calderon instead. Translation: He's a pain in the ass. I thought his numbers would jump when they traded Calderon, but he just submitted his worst month of the year. Strange. Maybe he's properly paid?

Vince Carter (Mavericks): 2 years, $6.3 million2
Reinvented himself as a valuable role player in Dallas, to the surprise and shock of just about everyone who expects him to roll around the floor like he's been shanked during a prison riot after every hard foul. I wish Indiana or Chicago had traded for him at the deadline, just to make the Eastern Conference race a little more interesting. Did you ever think VC would remain relevant as an NBA player longer than T-Mac did? He would have been a 10-to-1 underdog as recently as 2008, right?

Lance Stephenson (Pacers): 2 years, $1.9 million
Wait a second … LANCE STEPHENSON???? I know, I can't believe it either. Thanks to Danny Granger's injury, Stephenson somehow evolved into a fearless defender/athlete/wild card for a suddenly dangerous Pacers team. How good are they when they play George Hill, Paul George, David West, Roy Hibbert and Stephenson together? Their points-per-100-possessions and plus/minus stats are relatively staggering when compared to the most-used lineups by the four other contenders.

Hill-George-Stephenson-West-Hibbert: 877 mins, +240, 1.10 scored, 0.96 allowed.
Westbrook-Sefolosha-KD-Ibaka-Perkins: 852.4 mins, +147, 1.10 scored, 1.01 allowed.
Chalmers-Wade-LBJ-Bosh-Haslem: 445 mins, +120, 1.14 scored, 1.01 allowed.
Parker-Green-Leonard-Splitter-Duncan: 222.8 mins, +104, 1.08 scored, 0.85 allowed.
Paul-Green-Butler-Griffin-Jordan: 519.2 mins,+73, 1.13 scored, 1.06 allowed.

(So yeah … LANCE STEPHENSON!!!!)

Luc Mbah a Moute (Bucks): 3 years, $13.8 million
Love watching this dude play defense, love listening to opposing announcers mangle his name. You gotta hand it to Bucks GM John Hammond:3 He made three bad signing mistakes (the Drew Gooden/John Salmons/Corey Maggette contracts) and somehow extricated himself from two of them. He bailed on Andrew Bogut's contract at the perfect time. (Sorry, Warriors fans, it's true.) He nailed three first-rounders in four years (Brandon Jennings at 10, Larry Sanders at 15 and John Henson at 14) and smartly traded down in a crappy 2011 draft from 10 (Jimmer Fredette) to 19 (Tobias Harris) while dumping Salmons in the process. Looking at their roster right now, they don't have a single overpaid player except for Monta Ellis4 (probably bolting this summer) and Gooden (an amnesty candidate). Watch what happens this summer when Hammond flips Jennings (eligible for a big extension) for assets to some desperate team that wants to stupidly overpay him — it's the same thing New Orleans should have done with Eric Gordon (and didn't). More on this later.

Ryan Anderson (Hornets): 4 years, $34 million
It remains unclear why Orlando believed last summer that one of the league's best shooters didn't fit into its rebuilding strategy for a pretty fair price. On the bright side …

Tobias Harris (Magic): 4 years, $9.25 million
I remember watching the 20-year-old Harris look good in an early-November Bucks-Celtics game and thinking, Who the hell is Tobias Harris? Wasn't he in that goofy Sacramento/Milwaukee/Charlotte trade that somehow made all three teams worse? Turned out it was his best game of the season — Scott Skiles buried him in December and that was that. Then he ended up being Orlando's big haul in the Redick deal, and within 24 hours, the Magic were giving him Dwight Howard's old number. Intriguing talent.

Isaiah Thomas (Kings): 2 years, $1.65 million
Left him off only because his minutes seem to ebb and flow depending on the month. Why can't I shake the feeling that he's simply a good stats/bad team guy? Actually, I just described everyone on the Kings.

Jared Dudley (Suns): 3 years, $12.75 million
Every summer and every February, the Smart Teams (a.k.a. Houston, Dallas, San Antonio and Oklahoma City) tried to fleece the bumbling Suns for Dudley, and after about the 47th time it happened, the bumbling Suns decided, "We must really have something here, the Smart Teams keep trying to trade for him!" So in a roundabout away, they're overrating him — even though having Dudley on a lottery team is like hiring Tommy Lee Jones to play the fifth lead in an Adam Sandler movie. Dudley is a character actor. He should be the seventh man on a contender giving them elite shooting/energy/chemistry/fist-bumping/towel-wavin g/prolonged hugs — that's his destiny, and that was always his destiny. And it will happen at some point. But you should never underestimate the sway of the Smart Teams. Every time they want someone, it inadvertently bumps up that player's value.

And now, our best 16 bargains for the 2012-13 season …

16. Joakim Noah (Bulls): 4 years, $50.5 million
Fresh off the semi-historic 20-20-10 game Thursday night! Put it this way: His 2013 cap figure ($11.05 million) is less than Nene, Bogut and Emeka Okafor; significantly less than Dwight Howard; just about the same as DeAndre Jordan and JaVale McGee; and slightly over $3 million more than Kendrick Perkins. He's a borderline steal. As an added bonus, he's just about clinched the 2013 Bill Laimbeer Award as my least favorite Boston opponent unless Dwyane Wade tries to maim a Celtic between now and June. Don't rule this out.

15. Danny Green (Spurs): 3 years, $11.3 million
I can't remember a more polarizing trade in NBA nerd circles than Memphis dealing Rudy Gay for 50 cents on the dollar, nor can I remember personally having a weirder reaction to a deal — I came away from it thinking, the Grizzlies absolutely had to deal Gay, and Toronto absolutely had to grab him. Which makes no sense whatsoever. By dumping Gay's deal for Tayshaun Prince (40 percent of Gay's price) and young rebounder Ed Davis, Memphis was essentially saying, We're building around Gasol, Z-Bo, Conley and a bunch of cheaper perimeter guys. I like that strategy, and here's why: You can always find cheap perimeter guys who can defend and shoot 3s. Heck, look at this page so far. Notice the preponderance of cheap perimeter assets? They're always kicking around.

And if you have the kind of system that rewards specific types of players — say, a long-armed defender who makes corner 3s, or a run-and-gun streak shooter — that's even better. The Spurs realized after their Richard Jefferson catastrophe that they should never pay anyone eight figures other than Parker, Duncan and Ginobili — essentially, they decided to wager on their drafting (Kawhi Leonard) and waiver wire savvy (Green) for that position, hitting the jackpot twice.5 Maybe Memphis believed they could find more Danny Greens, and that the difference between what Gay was giving them (40 percent shooting, 30 percent from 3) wasn't dramatically different than a past-his-prime Prince, or the two dozen role players and journeymen shooting 36 percent or better from 3 on this list or this one. Should it mean something that the Smart Teams plus Memphis (five of the premier advanced-metrics teams) all came to the same conclusion about overpaying perimeter guys who aren't All-Stars? I say yes.

14. Rajon Rondo (Celtics): 3 years, $36 million
Would have finished much higher on this list before the torn ACL, obviously. Hey, am I the only Celtics fan who's secretly holding out hope that Rondo will return for the 2013 playoffs because (a) he only has a partially torn ACL, (b) he might be an alien, and (c) if he IS an alien, an alien should be able to regenerate that ACL faster than a human would?

13. Omer Asik (Rockets): 3 years, $25.1 million
Let's face it: Chicago blew it by not matching Houston's poison-pill offer for Asik ($5 million this season, $5 million next season, $14.9 million in Year 3), then inking Taj Gibson to a four-year, $38 million extension (kicking in next season). Why not keep Asik and take care of Gibson next summer? Who was paying Gibson more than $38 million when his specific style fits Chicago better than any other team? This season he's playing 22.2 minutes, giving them his usual stellar defense and averaging 7.7 points and 5.4 boards. Um … another team was breaking the bank for Gibson during an era when everyone is TERRIFIED of the luxury tax? Didn't the Bulls out-think themselves?

Why not …

• Shell out $7.1 million in 2012-13 for Asik ($5 million) and Gibson ($2.1 million) instead of $4.9 million for Gibson and two lukewarm bodies (Nazr Mohammed and Vlad Radmanovic), then deal with Gibson's extension after the season?

• Keep their options open with Asik and Gibson while seeing how Derrick Rose's post-ACL progress is coming?

• Either bite the tax bullet and keep Asik AND Gibson (and amnesty Carlos Boozer after the season), or shop Asik before this season's trade deadline for future assets? Like Houston wouldn't have traded for him? Or the Lakers wouldn't have been intrigued by an "Asik/Deng/Charlotte's future no. 1 for Dwight Howard" offer?

The bigger point: If you're a big-market contender, you can't lose an asset for absolutely nothing. Just sell the team at that point. Why even own it? You're gonna sweat out the luxury tax every year when you're in Chicago, the third-biggest TV market in America and a city that could absolutely support two professional basketball teams? And yes, Asik is an asset. We didn't need to see him thrive in Houston to realize that Omer Asik was good at basketball. Throw in his age (26) and I think Chicago blew this one. Try not to bring this up to Reggie Rose.

12. Konstantine Demetrios Koufos (Nuggets): 3 years, $9 million
I don't totally trust per-36-minute stats because they reward bench guys who can play their asses off for two eight-minute stretches over someone who knows he has to pace himself for 36 to 40 minutes, night after night, for somewhere between six and eight straight months (depending on playoffs). Having said that, Denver bumped Koufos's numbers to 23 minutes a night, with his per-36-minute numbers holding nicely: 12.7 points, 10.3 boards, 2.2 blocks, 60% FG. He's one of those old-school big guys who know where to go and what to do, rarely if ever trying anything outside his expertise. He's also the MVP of the "Should I Check My Hair Before I Go Out for Warm-ups? Nahhhhhhh … " Team.

11. Nikola Vucevic (Magic): 4 years, $10.6 million
It was funny to hear Doug Collins mention how much he missed the 22-year-old rebounding stud during Tuesday night's bitch session when (a) Collins held so much sway over Philly's front office that their top two GM candidates backed out last summer because they didn't want to battle him (so for him to pretend that he had nothing to do with the Andrew Bynum trade was disingenuous at best), and (b) he absolutely BURIED Vucevic during the 2012 playoffs for reasons that remain unclear. (See Zach Lowe's Philly shredding for all the gory details.) And yes, Orlando somehow winning the Dwight Howard three-way trade might have supplanted "USA 4, USSR 3" as the biggest sports upset of all time.

10. Ray Allen (Heat): 2 years, $6.3 million
9. Shane Battier (Heat): 2 years, $6.4 million
Battier has become a goofy litmus test for Miami's success/failure; when he's nailing 3s, they're just about unstoppable. (Check out his numbers in wins versus losses, and check out his numbers during February's 12-game win streak. He's like their good-luck charm.) As for Allen, he might murder them defensively, but his clutch shooting makes up for it. NBA.com's tremendous new stats page tells us that, in crunch-time situations (close games, five minutes or less), Allen is 20th in points (70), first in 3s (13) and first in field goal percentage of any top-25 scorer (52.5 percent). In other words, he's having a typical Ray Allen season. TRAITOR! TRAITOR! TRAITOR! I apologize, I couldn't stop my fingers there for a couple of seconds.

The bigger point: These Allen/Battier contracts should absolutely be considered part of LeBron's 2013 MVP candidacy. He's so good that he convinced two killer role players to play with him for SEVERE discounts. Take that, Kevin Durant.

8. Greivis Vasquez (Hornets): 3 years, $6.5 million
Remember that crazy Salary Cap Fantasy League I wrote about 15 months ago? I ended up joining it this year as my buddy Chen's co-owner. We made our first trade one week into the season, a trade that I pushed hard for … that's right, Greivis Vasquez straight-up for Klay Thompson.

(Gulp.)

The thinking behind it: Thompson started out slow (so we were buying low), and Vasquez was a flash in the pan who would lose minutes when Eric Gordon came back (so we were selling high). Whoops.6 I'd add a "The lesson, as always: Maybe I shouldn't be a GM" joke here, but we already learned that during the 2011 draft when I made fun of Cleveland for taking Kyrie Irving over Derrick Williams.

7. Chandler Parsons (Rockets): 3 years, $2.78 million
When Dork Elvis dealt a former lottery pick (Morris Twin X) to Phoenix for a future second-round pick, on the surface it seemed like a salary/minutes dump. But was it? The Rockets were betting on their history of finding second-round gems (Carl Landry, Chase Budinger and Parsons), as well as the upside that comes with locking down a potential rotation guy at an absurdly cheap price.

Our 17 best second-rounders since 2006: Paul Millsap, Steve Novak, Carl Landry, Glen Davis, Marc Gasol, Ramon Sessions, Nikola Pekovic, DeAndre Jordan, Omer Asik, Goran Dragic, Marcus Thornton, Chase Budinger, Danny Green, Lance Stephenson, Kyle Singler, Chandler Parsons and Isaiah Thomas. Including Novak (whom they waived eventually), the Rockets somehow landed four of them. Thanks to Phoenix, they'll be picking in the mid-30s this June looking for a fifth winner. Why wouldn't the Suns have just kept the pick and tried to play those same second-round odds? Because they had to reunite the Morris Twins! Look, everyone, we have twins! These guys look exactly alike!!!! COME SEE THE TWINS!!!!!!!

6. Marc Gasol (Grizzlies): 3 years, $44.6 million
He's the best all-around center in basketball, as well as a charter member of the "Man, That Guy Looks Like He'd Be Fun to Play Hoops With" All-Stars, so anything less than the max automatically vaults him into our top six.

The bigger question: Where does he rank on the list of siblings who improbably flipped the script and became more successful than their famous brother or sister (or as I dubbed this in 2005, The Shue Phenomenon)? And is this a momentary blip (like with Charlie Murphy, Andrew Shue or Kevin Dillon)? Will Pau someday regain dominant sibling status like Elisabeth Shue did? Or is this the new reality — like how Serena Williams eventually became the dominant Williams sister, or Jason Bateman assumed control of the Bateman family, or that one Klitschko brother became the dominant Klitschko brother over the other Klitschko brother even as we continued to be unable to tell them apart?

5. Al Horford (Hawks): 4 years, $48 million
He signed a five-year, $60 million extension in November of 2010, so we're only in Year 2 of what almost immediately became a doozy of a bargain for the Hawks. He's the league's 41st highest-paid player right now, earning significantly less than peers like Pau Gasol, Zach Randolph and Chris Bosh. Carlos Boozer and Al Jefferson make 25 percent more per year than Horford does. Heck, Kris Humphries makes as much per year as Horford does.

Quick tangent: I understand why players gravitate toward grabbing guaranteed money over just rolling things over and betting on themselves in the open market. I do. Just understand that it's the best possible way for a team to pay discount prices for an All-Star … as long as you're betting on the right guy (Rondo, Horford, Noah, Ibaka, Holiday or Curry) and not the wrong guy (like $50 million for Andrea Bargnani).

Flipping that around: You might remember Roy Hibbert, Nic Batum and Eric Gordon passing up extensions and betting on themselves as restricted free agents. What happened last summer? Hibbert and Gordon landed max deals; Batum landed $46.5 million over four years. Expect the same good fortune for Brandon Jennings this summer — back in October, he only wanted the same numbers that Holiday and Curry were getting, Milwaukee balked, and now he's headed into the open market as a possible max guy during a piss-poor summer for marquee free agents. Should Jennings make more than Ibaka or Lawson?

(Hold on, I have to find my cap locks key. Give me one second here.)

NO!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! NO, A THOUSAND TIMES NO NO NO!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

You can't give the max or even anything close to the max to a shoot-first point guard who makes 40 percent of his shots, especially if it's someone who undeniably hurts his teams in crunch time. Of the 25 players who took the most "clutch" shots so far this season (close games, three minutes or less), Jennings has the second-worst field goal percentage (27.3 percent) and is tied for the fourth-most turnovers (nine). During the 2011-12 season, he took the fifth-most clutch shots (63) and made the lowest percentage of anyone in the top 25 (20.6 percent). During the 2010-11 season, he had the lowest "clutch" field goal percentage (25 percent) of anyone in the top 20 not named "DeMarcus Cousins" (a rookie that year). Really, he should be making Mike Conley/Goran Dragic/Jeremy Lin money (something like $8 million a year), but as they say in auctions, it only takes two dummies to drive up someone's price. No offense to Brandon Jennings, but I can't wait to make fun of the team that gives him $58 million over four years. And it WILL happen. (End tangent.)

4. Kevin Garnett (Celtics), 3 years, $36 million
3. Tim Duncan (Spurs): 3 years, $30.4 million
You know what's amazing about these guys other than the stuff you already knew was amazing? It's Year 18 for Garnett and Year 16 for Duncan, although Duncan is older by 3.5 weeks (they're both 36). Including playoffs, they've logged over 100,000 minutes combined already. They played 40 minutes a night at their peaks; now they play 30 minutes a night. But check out their per-36-minute numbers for this season and their careers as a whole.

Duncan, 2013: 20.3 PPG, 11.7 RPG, 3.2 APG, 4.2 SBPG,7 49% FG, 81% FT, 23.8 PER
Duncan, career: 20.6 PPG, 11.5 RPG, 3.1 APG, 3.1 SBPG , 51% FG, 69% FT, 24.7 PER
Garnett, 2013: 17.9 PPG, 9.2 RPG, 2.7 APG, 2.5 SBPG, 50% FG, 78% FT, 19.4 PER
Garnett, career: 19.0 PPG, 10.4 RPG, 3.9 APG, 2.8 SBPG, 50% FG, 79% FT, 23.2 PER

Isn't that crazy? They're playing 25 percent less, but with little to no difference in per-minute efficiency and no real signs of decline. Even better, they took hometown discounts so their teams could build around them a little more easily. You know, like what Kobe did with the Lakers — only the exact opposite.

(Sorry, I had to.)

2. Tony Parker (Spurs): 3 years, $37.5 million
I'm a humongous Parker fan. I love watching him do his thing. I love the camaraderie between Duncan, Popovich, Parker and Ginobili — they've been together so long that it's almost like watching one of those great married couples that make you say, "Wow, those two really like each other," only in this case, it's "those four." I don't believe the Spurs are even remotely boring, and anyone who says that doesn't actually like basketball. I believe the Spurs have been the best NBA team through four months, and that Parker has been their most valuable player — like Chris Paul with the Clippers, Parker is a Formula One driver operating a machine that was specifically built for him. (Other people could drive it, but nobody drives it like him.) And I believe Parker should be making $18-20 million a year like the other franchise guys, so locking him down for $12.5 million for this season and the next two … I mean … that's highway robbery. But he's not the MVP, and anyone who argues that is just being silly.

1. LeBron James (Heat): 2 years, $36.6 million
Here's your MVP. Actually, this is always your MVP, as long as he's playing 39 minutes a night, slapping up 27-8-8s, shooting 55 percent, playing four positions and defending the other team's best guy. Just stop. Stop bringing up anyone else. He's the greatest player in 20 years.

For the purposes of this column: If the NBA operated with an open market like baseball does, and teams could spend whatever they wanted without any real fear of the luxury tax, then LeBron would earn more than four times what he's making right now. You heard me … $75 million per season. That's not a misprint. The Lakers, Knicks and Nets would pay him that without blinking. Think of what you're getting: He drives up your courtside prices, your suite prices, your cable ratings (Miami's jumped 34 percent last season) and your sponsorship packages; he makes you the league's most relevant franchise; he guarantees you 10-12 playoff home games every year; and oh yeah, you might win a few championships, too.

And actually, that $75 million number might be low. Once a year, Forbes magazine breaks down the team value of every NBA franchise. This year's report was especially fascinating — Forbes reported that the average value of the 30 teams had risen to $509 million, a 30 percent increase from last year, saying that "the increase is due to higher revenue from television, new and renovated arenas, and the NBA's new collective-bargaining agreement, which reduced player costs from 57% of revenues to roughly 50%." Translation: The owners didn't just beat the players in that last lockout; they trounced them like it was one of those Cowboys-Bills Super Bowls.

Anyway, in 2009, Forbes valued the Cavaliers at $476 million and the Heat at $364 million. Four years later, they valued the Cavaliers at $434 million … and the Heat at $625 million. Gee, I wonder what changed.

(LeBron James, you deserve a raise. A massive one. Just know that you won't get it.)
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The Designated Player: The Scottish Play, Andy Roxburgh, and the Latest Plan for New
Posted by: timbersfan, 1:04 AM GMT on March 09, 2013 +0
“Oh, he talks to himself, aye?”

Andy Roxburgh is talking about Bruce Arena. He’s not been at New York Red Bulls long, but it appears the new Sporting Director may have already been asked one too many times about the management model at the Los Angeles Galaxy, and can’t resist a wry little dig at the head coach and general manager of the current MLS champions.

Roxburgh barely pauses on the aside, though, launching straight into a detailed breakdown of the new Red Bulls management structure: “What happens in this case, is this model is based on the French FA. The French FA when Gerard [Houllier, Red Bulls global director of soccer] was there, was the technical director and the CEO, and one didn’t answer to the other. They were in partnership, they linked occasionally, when appropriate. But each one of them was responsible for his own area, and the person who was above them is only one person, who’s the president. Now, it’s the same model here.”

The Scotsman is animated company, perhaps never more so than when discussing the minutiae of planning and coordinating a team. Perhaps it’s his two decades as the technical director of UEFA talking — and at times it makes for a slightly uncanny sensation conversationally. There are moments when Roxburgh slips into a tempo of talking where he’ll use vague phrases such as suggesting that the “Red” in “Red Bulls” might stand for “passion” — phrases that will then segue into more detailed staccato bullet points. At those moments it’s a little like hearing a PowerPoint presentation come to life. And despite Roxburgh’s visible track-suited presence in his early days at the Red Bulls, it does at times create the sense of a bureaucrat as much as a soccer man.

That’s unfair to Roxburgh, though. When he’s asked about his time at UEFA, and what saw him make the turn to a new continent at this stage of his working life (he’ll be 70 this year and could easily have seen out his career within UEFA), Roxburgh actually glosses over his working with the more glamorous European federations such as Spain, Germany, and France to talk about the “adventure” (a word he uses repeatedly) of developing new territories. "The big thing for us (UEFA) was developing Eastern Europe and developing smaller countries. There was a big adventure involved in doing all of that. And with FIFA, I was all over the planet. I was in Japan every two years since 1996, I was endlessly in Malaysia trying to create a coaching license there. So that kind of, if you like, spirit of adventure, new territory, that was also fascinating here [MLS]."

The adventurer, though, has landed in a very specific part of MLS — a franchise where “building and building and building” has historically come a poor second to “rip it up and start again.” Roxburgh’s plans may be detail-oriented, but the Red Bulls have been a byword for making plans and God laughing. Season after season, no New York team has won an MLS Cup — a fact that at first became a curiosity in MLS circles, then a recurring talking point, then a joke, then a strange kind of stigma regarding what the Red Bulls apparently represented — a somehow un-American attempt to buy the championship through a high turnover of superannuated foreign mercenaries. Whether it was actually true mattered less than the popular conception.

And it got more pronounced each year, as an ever less subtle urgency kicked in. Successive management regimes would make all the right noises about the MLS orthodoxy of a stable team, built around young Americans, being the key to success. But in the meantime, the pattern of roster turnover has been one that suggests, “Let’s just win this year to get the monkey off our back … and we can be prudent and long term next year.” The result was repeated stacking and unpacking of rosters that were pushed hard against the salary cap; repeated shipping out of promising American youngsters to do their best work elsewhere; and repeated failure in the playoffs.

Roxburgh inherited such a team, when he officially arrived, on the day previous head coach Hans Backe left — the day after the 2012 playoff loss to D.C. United. Backe hadn’t done badly in some ways. He joined the club after a disastrous 2009 campaign and took them to three successive playoff spots, including winning the Eastern Conference in his first year, and getting a record points haul last season. But he never got past the conference semifinals. Meanwhile, his sporting director, Erik Soler, had a bumpy entry into the conventions of the MLS circuit, as the Red Bulls seemed to get the rough end of several trades — most notably the sequence between them, Toronto, and D.C. that saw Dwayne De Rosario pass briefly through the New York team. De Rosario was back at Red Bull Arena a couple of weeks ago for MLS media day. What did he make of Backe? A shrug: “He had all the tools. He just didn’t know how to use the tools.”

Before last season started, Backe told me briskly that “Now it’s time to win something,” as though winning a championship were something akin to finally getting around to clearing leaves from the guttering. The season started fairly promisingly. Soler seemed to have finally gotten the hang of how to make deals, engaging well in the more arcane practices such as trading discovery rights, and bringing some convincing looking signings to the team. Kenny Cooper arrived from Portland and scored 18 goals. Young players like Connor Lade and Ryan Meara came to the team and had breakout years, and Dax McCarty, the apparently underwhelming option received from D.C. in the De Rosario trade, had a career year as a defensive midfielder. The team went on an unbeaten home run till the early fall, and things were looking good for postseason progress in the last year of Backe’s contract.

But the elevation of Gerard Houllier to global director of Red Bull soccer seemed to change all that. New York Red Bulls general manager Chris Heck was the first immediate casualty. Soler briefly assumed his duties but then was swiftly replaced by Jerome de Bontin with just a few weeks left to go in the regular season. Backe, now clearly a lame duck manager, took his side into the playoffs, but the sight on TV of D.C. United coach Ben Olsen champing at the bit to play a road game in snow, while the home coach Backe insisted that this was “not soccer,” left an unfortunate image of the head coach as having no appetite left for the challenge. The next day, his team crashed out, and a day later, he was gone.

In truth, though, he was gone long before. Soler’s departure had set the clock ticking publicly. It’s doubtful even an MLS Cup would have saved Backe at that point. Roxburgh’s arrival had been in the works for months, even if the Scot had been unsure about making the move. “Last summer when they started talking to me about coming here, it was only talk," he says. "I flew up last August and had a look, but it was no more than that. I started to mull it over, and it gradually materialized. So then before I knew it, then I was here.”

Roxburgh was “here” for the start of a cull. The latest side to be pushed right against the salary cap for Backe’s final tilt at the MLS Cup now had to be dismantled, and 16 players left during the offseason. Astonishingly, when the dust had cleared, the team’s longest-serving players remaining were Roy Miller (three years) and Thierry Henry (two and a half years). When I mentioned this fact to the latter a few days ago, he exhaled hard and said, “It’s kind of weird. I looked at Roy the other day and said, [mimes looking around an empty room] ‘Only us.' Both of us are like the granddads of the team. I should be like a rookie. But change happens.”

Roxburgh also had to quickly learn the realities of roster-building in MLS. When I ask him about the first time he sat down and looked at the roster while having to make salary-cap calculations, he rolls his eyes:

“I’ve only got two words for you: ‘Kenny. Cooper.’ I’m still in denial. I fought for nearly a month to keep Kenny Cooper. I said, ‘Over my dead body!’ So I actually shouldn’t be standing here. Great boy, goalscorer, and they keep telling me, ‘You can’t keep him. You just can’t have him. You need to sell him because somebody wants him; his price is too high; he puts us on the right side, in terms of salary cap.' I could have kept him, but it would have brought the rest of it into real difficulties. But it was not a football decision.”

I found myself wondering who this prescriptive "they" are. When I spoke to then-interim coach Mike Petke at the combine, he was accompanied by team technical director Ricardo Campos, and Petke was making similar comments about “being shown the numbers by this guy (indicating Campos), and wishing I hadn’t seen them." Campos was a survivor of the Backe era, having served as right-hand man to Soler, and helped ease his boss into the nuances of MLS — picking up more influence himself along the way. When Roxburgh arrived, he was sufficiently impressed by Campos, and, of course, by Petke, to retain them, and ultimately place his faith in the latter as head coach. Roxburgh has placed a lot of trust in the understanding Petke and Campos have about the league, and while he has brought in key performance staff on the fitness side, other young staff, such as performance analyst David Lee, have been maintained to grow with the project. There have also been other key shifts in staffing priorities:

“The first thing I did was make the doctors the king of the castle. Riley Williams, our top doctor, is no. 1 — he wasn’t that. Doctors didn’t even travel with us. I heard that, and I was like, ‘What?’ Literally, 'What?!' Every meal has been controlled by our fitness coach, Davide, who came from Barcelona, with a nutritionist. Everything has been organized in terms of what they eat. It’s all small things that all make you professional.”

There have been player arrivals, too. Juninho, of course, but perhaps most notably as a statement of intent, the capture of Espindola and Olave from Real Salt Lake. Thierry Henry has been a particularly public admirer of the Salt Lake way, raising inevitable message-board speculation that he's had an influence on bringing the pair to the club, or even having influence on the choice of new head coach. Not that Henry has any patience with those suggestions. When asked at MLS media day if he’d been consulted by management on who should be the new coach, Henry deadpanned, “Yes. They said, ‘Mike is the boss.’”

While the speculation around Henry is inevitable, given his profile, and while his presence, and to a lesser extent, that of Tim Cahill, poses unique challenges for a first-time MLS coach like Petke, the personnel changes at the less high-profile end of the roster do give New York fans some cause for guarded optimism. When I speak to McCarty about how Roxburgh’s vision can be bedded in with a side that's still learning one another’s names, and where Miller and Henry are now the longest-standing members, he says, "Sometimes organizations do so much to try to win and bring a championship, they’re always trying constantly to bring in the right players. But I think, in MLS, what’s been successful has been the teams that have stuck with certain guys for a long term. Especially Salt Lake — they had the same team for three years, and it brought them a lot of success. The main thing that Andy has already proved in his time here, is that he wants to build that foundation. He’s re-signed Ryan Meara, Connor Lade, Brandon Barklage, and myself. All young, hard-working, American guys that I think sometimes get overlooked in this league. But at the end of the day, you need players like that to win."

We’re speaking at this year’s Red Bulls media day, held in a lofty studio space in Manhattan’s Chelsea Piers. Somewhere on the other side of the room, Mike Petke is sitting behind a dais affably holding court with a media scrum. Henry is already stooping for photographs for the season ticket holders party that immediately follows the event, having patiently fielded questions in French, Spanish, and English for much of the afternoon. The Salt Lake pair of Espindola and Olave ease themselves out of the directors chairs they’ve been placed in for the afternoon, and quietly enter the gathering throng of New York fans — a long way from Utah. Ricardo Campos moves through the crowd unnoticed. Roxburgh watches it all, waiting for Sunday’s first game and the first results of the latest best-laid plans.

New York starts its season on the road against the Portland Timbers Sunday night at 7:30 p.m. ET.

Graham Parker (@kidweil) leads the U.S. and MLS soccer coverage for The Guardian. He also writes for Howler.
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The Worst Contracts in the NBA
Posted by: timbersfan, 1:03 AM GMT on March 09, 2013 +0
Was there a Patient Zero for atrocious NBA contracts? I always assumed it was Jon Koncak, the unassuming center who improbably caused a bidding war between Detroit and Atlanta during the summer of 1989. His per-game numbers for the previous season: 20.7 minutes, 4.7 points, 6.1 rebounds. Zaza Pachulia's numbers, basically. That didn't stop the defending-champion Pistons from deviously driving up Koncak's price to screw over their Eastern Conference rivals. Atlanta finally panicked, handing Koncak a whopping six-year, $13.1 million extension. Poor Koncak never matched those uninspiring 1988-89 numbers, eventually earning the derisive nickname "Jon Contract."

And yet … he wasn't Patient Zero. I spent a few hours researching bad contracts and realized it was someone else, someone I never expected. But first, a little history. Our first batch of dumb contracts happened in the early 1970s, when the ABA brazenly beat the NBA in a few bidding wars, driving up prices for the guys they didn't get. You know how that turned out: They bankrupted their own league in 1976. That's the same summer the NBA created restricted free agency (if you signed someone else's player, the league decided compensation), which led to doozies like New Orleans overpaying Gail Goodrich and giving the Lakers two first-rounders (including the one that became Magic Johnson), or the Clippers gutting their team so they could overpay a broken-down Bill Walton, or the Knicks lavishing Marvin "The Human Eraser" Webster with a five-year, $3 million deal after his sparkling performance in the '78 playoffs. The second half of the 1970s were being marred by the first wave of overpaid "stars" like Sidney Wicks, Spencer Haywood, George McGinnis, Bob McAdoo, Rick Barry (who landed a $500,000-per-year contract from Houston well after his prime) and even the once-great Pete Maravich (sorry, it's true).

The first batch of atrocious contracts? That didn't happen until the NBA created a salary cap and then added things like unrestricted free agency. Suddenly, atrocious contracts had real consequences — if you overpaid the wrong guys, you fell into NBA quicksand. Nobody realized this faster than the real Patient Zero, as well as the most incompetent owner in NBA history. His name was Ted Stepien. In 1980, Stepien parlayed his minority stake in the Cavaliers into full control of the franchise. His first big move happened two months before the sale went through: He flipped Butch Lee (a backup guard) and Cleveland's 1982 first-round pick to the Lakers for Don Ford (a backup forward) and L.A.'s 1980 first-round pick (needless to say, not a great pick). Two years later, Los Angeles picked James Worthy first overall with Cleveland's pick. The lesson, as always: God hates Cleveland.

Wait, it gets worse. Later in 1980, Stepien sent four unprotected first-rounders to Dallas from 1983 to 1986 — FOUR!!!! — in three separate trades for four guys ranging from "borderline starter" to "unequivocal backup": Mike Bratz, Geoff Huston, Richard Washington and Jerome Whitehead, planting the seeds for a contender in Dallas in the process.1 That's when Stepien made history three different times.

1. Then-commissioner Larry O'Brien ruled that Stepien couldn't make another trade unless it was approved by the league.

2. The NBA made a new rule that no team could trade consecutive first-round picks … which, naturally, ended up being called the Stepien Rule. (The lesson, as always: Any time you have a rule named after you in sports, you did something truly influential or truly atrocious.)

3. In 1983, Stepien sold the Cavs for $20 million. As part of the sale, the NBA broke precedent by giving the new Cleveland owners four compensatory first-rounders from 1983 to 1986 to help their recovery from Hurricane Stepien.2

So even if Stepien didn't need the summer of '81 to secure his legacy of incompetence, that didn't stop him from making it rain like Floyd Mayweather at the Spearmint Rhino. He offered a five-year, $5 million deal to scorer Otis Birdsong,3 which Kansas City reluctantly matched even though the deal paid Birdsong more than Larry Bird and as much as Kareem Abdul-Jabbar. You know what the Kings didn't match? Stepien's absurd five-year, $4 million offer for shooter Scott Wedman, which was the 1981 equivalent of giving Ryan Anderson $15 million a year. Stepien also overpaid Indiana center James Edwards (four years, $3.2 million) and Chicago backup guard Bobby Wilkerson (four years, $1.4 million) before inspiring Sports Illustrated's inevitable "WTF?!?!?!?!?" feature that included this eerily hilarious passage:

"Last week many of the general managers attending the NBA's annual meetings in Danvers, Mass.,4 were suggesting that Stepien's offers represented an irresponsible approach to free agency that other clubs wouldn't duplicate. What's more likely is that basketball is now in a situation similar to baseball's, in which the owners talk of controlling salaries but trip over themselves in their rush to give big money to mediocre players."
BOOM! I think we found our Patient Zero! I should have known that Cleveland would be involved. By the end of that Danvers meeting, Seattle had offered package worth $3.1 million to Alex English (Denver smartly matched) and $400,000 a year to Steve Hawes (Atlanta stupidly matched). Even the great Dr. Jerry Buss couldn't help himself, stealing Mitch Kupchak from Washington with an insane seven-year, $5.6 million offer, then making up for that travesty by locking up Magic Johnson with a historic 25-year, $25 million extension. In other words, the good doctor went one-for-two. Just remember that Stepien got everything rolling; the summer of '81 paved the way for Jon Contract, Jim McIlvaine's ludicrous $35 million extension that destroyed the '97 Sonics, Steve Francis and Stephon Marbury making a combined $30.2 million a year for a 23-win Knicks team, the Atrocious GM Summit, Orlando swapping Rashard Lewis's appalling nine-figure contract for Gilbert Arenas's appalling nine-figure contract, the creation of the amnesty clause and everything else.

Why haven't we done a 30 for 30 about Ted Stepien yet? Honestly, I don't know. We've failed. That's the only answer I can give you. Just know that he's Patient Zero for bad contracts. Which brings us to this season's batch of atrocities. Last week, I broke down the NBA's best bargains and decided that LeBron James should make $75 million a year. Our worst NBA bargains can be separated into the following six categories:

Category 1: Expiring Atrocities

There's light at the end of the tunnel of salary hell for Corey Maggette's expiring deal ($10.9 million), as well as the ones for Stephen Jackson ($10.1 million), Mo Williams ($8.5 million), Devin Harris ($8.5 million), Chris Kaman ($8 million), Beno Udrih ($7.8 million), DeSagana Diop ($7.4 million), Francisco Garcia ($6.1 million) and Luke Walton ($6.1 million). Only two expiring deals cracked our master list of top 30 atrocities (we'll get to them).

Category 2: Amnestied Contracts or Deals That Were Bought Out

Quick refresher on the amnesty clause: You still have to pay out the contract, it just doesn't count for salary cap/luxury tax purposes. If another team signs that player, his next salary (usually much lower) comes off the original team's remaining amnesty debt. That list includes Brandon Roy (Portland: three years and $49 million left); Gilbert Arenas (Orlando: two years, $43.1 million); Josh Childress (Phoenix: three years, $21 million); Brendan Haywood (Dallas: three years, $21.2 million); Luis Scola (Houston: three years, $17 million); Travis Outlaw (Brooklyn: three years, $12 million); Chris Andersen (Denver: two years, $9.3 million); Ryan Gomes (Clippers: one year, $4 million); and the one and only Darko Milicic (Minnesota: one year, $5.2 million).

I'm proud to say that I made fun of five of those signings (Arenas, Childress, Haywood, Outlaw and Darko) as they happened. Four other amnesty/buyout guys require special recognition:

Andray Blatche (Washington: three years, $23.4 million)
Blatche signed a three-year, $23.4 million extension in September of 2010 that didn't kick in until the 2012-13 season. They amnestied him last summer. Hold on, I'll let you do the math. (Waiting.) Did you figure it out? Yup, Blatche's extension was such a mistake that the Wizards ended up amnestying it before it even started! Ted Leonsis and Ernie Grunfeld are like Bizarro Jerry Buss and Bizarro Jerry West.

Elton Brand (Philly: one year, $16.1 million)
The Sixers could have kept Brand as a locker room leader and expiring contract/trade chip for the 2012-13 season, but they amnestied him so they could spend that cap space on Spencer Hawes (two years, $13 million), Nick Young (one year, $6 million) and Kwame Brown (one year, $3 million). In other words, they threw away $16.1 million to give themselves a chance to waste another $22 million. NBA teams are really, really dumb. Don't forget this for a second.

Rashard Lewis (New Orleans: one year, $13.7 million)
That was Lewis's buyout price for the last year of a watershed $118 million deal that Orlando's Otis Smith gift wrapped him in 2007, just two years after Smith drafted Fran Vazquez over Danny Granger … who could have given Orlando everything Smith wanted from Lewis for one-fifteenth of the price. Who was Smith bidding against for Lewis that summer? We don't know. Why did he pay Lewis $50 million more than he was worth? We don't know. Why hasn't anyone hired Otis since Orlando fired him last year? We don't — oh, wait, we know.

In general, the 2000s became the heyday for "I'm Worried About Keeping My Young Superstar Long-Term, So Instead of Patiently Building a Contender Around Him, I'll Overpay for Immediate Help and Ruin My Cap Space!" panic contracts like Lewis, Larry Hughes, Donyell Marshall, Antawn Jamison, Eddy Curry and Wally Szczerbiak, or even lesser atrocities like Marko Jaric, Jamaal Tinsley, Alvin Williams, Tim Thomas and everyone Philly signed to play with Allen Iverson. It's also the reason Oklahoma City 's nucleus was constructed so carefully. Sam Presti learned from those mistakes, took the marathon-not-a-sprint approach and patiently built a contender around Kevin Durant. Had Orlando/Cleveland taken the same approach with Howard/LeBron, those guys would still be in Orlando and Cleveland. Hey, speaking of Cleveland …

Baron Davis (Cleveland: one year, $14.85 million)
The Baron trade should get mentioned more often in any "Secretly Great NBA Trades of All Time" discussion, as well as any "Secretly Worst NBA Trades of All Time" discussion. In February of 2011, the Clippers dumped Baron's contract on Cleveland, along with their 2011 first-round pick, for the less expensive Mo Williams. The deal saved them about $13 million and allegedly upgraded their point guard spot. Of course, they're the Clippers, so they never protected the pick and it ended up winning the lottery. That's how Cleveland ended up with Kyrie Irving.

My favorite part of this felony of a trade: After the NBA fixed the lottery for Cleveland because they felt bad after LeBron screwed them over a year earlier the Cavs landed the first pick, the Clips defended the deal by saying they couldn't have protected the pick because they had already given away a previously protected first-rounder to Boston. (The obvious response to that defense: THEN DON'T MAKE THE DEAL, YOU MORONS!) Why couldn't the Clippers protect the pick? Because of the Stepien Rule! Woohoo! So if you're scoring at home, it took nearly 30 years before Ted Stepien helped the Cavaliers, but they wouldn't have Kyrie Irving without him. Maybe that's the ending for the 30 for 30 about Stepien that we'll never do.

Category 3: Overpaid Role Players

Look, I don't love the contracts for Marcus Thornton (three years, $24.5 million),
Tayshaun Prince (three years, $21.7 million), Al Harrington (three years, $21.4 million), Brandon Bass (three years, $20.3 million), Big Baby Davis (three years, $19.4 million), Caron Butler (two years, $16 million), Metta World Peace (two years, $15 million), Jonas Jerebko (three years, $13.5 million), Trevor Ariza (two years, $15 million) or even (gulp) Jason Terry (three years, $15.7 million).5 But you could play any of those guys 30 minutes a night without destroying your season. Bad contracts? Absolutely. Atrocities? Not really.

Category 4: Future Amnesty Candidates

I need my atrocious contracts to rot away on someone's salary cap like a bad piece of fruit. So it's bitterly disappointing that the following teams have their amnesties left for the following players: the Lakers (Metta World Amnesty Clause: two years, $15 million); Miami (Mike Miller: three years, $18.6 million);6 Milwaukee (Drew Gooden: three years, $20.2 million); Toronto (Linas Kleiza: two years, $9.2 million); Sacramento (John Salmons: two years, $15.7 million); and especially Charlotte (Tyrus Thomas: three years, $26.1 million), who pulled off the Double Atrocious GM Whammy of (a) trading a future lottery pick for an overrated player, and (b) giving that overrated player a ludicrous extension that they'd eventually have to amnesty.

(You realize that Chicago has Charlotte's first-rounder, and that it's top-12 protected in 2013, top-10 protected in 2014, top-eight protected in 2015 and completely unprotected in 2016 … right?)

(And you realize this happened because Charlotte decided, "We need to acquire Ty Thomas and give him a big fat deal, because once you give a perpetually underachieving NBA talent gobs of guaranteed money over a prolonged period of time, it always works out" … right?)

(Are we sure MJ isn't still working for the Bulls? I'm just asking.)

Category 5: Overpaid But Undeniably Productive Guys

Let's quickly tackle them one at a time …

Monta Ellis (two years, $22 million): Especially polarizing because every advanced statistic held a secret summit meeting and came to the conclusion, "We hate Monta Ellis, let's conspire to make him look as useless as possible." And yet he's a fearless scorer who always plays hard and leaves you feeling like you know he's flawed, but you also wouldn't mind going to war with him in a playoff series (especially if he was your sixth man, giving you instant offense). I saw him in person at Wednesday night's Clippers game and marveled at seven different Monta plays that ranged from "spectacular" to "WOW!!!!!!!!" Then again, the Bucks lost by 16 and Jamal Crawford out-Monta-ed Monta. Let's take this to the footnotes.7

Roy Hibbert (four years, $58.4 million): Even if he's been slumping offensively (and then some: 49.7 percent FG last year, 42.7 percent this year), Hibbert's sneaky-spectacular defense nearly caused a nerd riot at the Sloan Conference last weekend. Kirk Goldsberry PDF alert!!!

Jeff Green (four years, $35.2 million): Looked like a mortal lock for our top-30 as recently as six weeks ago … and then Rondo went down, the Celtics recommitted to defense, everyone's minutes fell into place, and Green turned into a thrilling two-way asset. You knew Boston was 14-4 without Rondo, but did you know Green averaged 15.1 points over that stretch, with 51-86-36 shooting splits, first-class defense and at least one above-the-rim highlight per night? What a comeback story. I can't emphasize this strongly enough … I did NOT see this coming. Here's how Celtics fans feel about Jeff Green and Avery Bradley right now.


Emeka Okafor (two years, $28.1 million): Since December 22, he's averaging 11.3 points and 11.3 rebounds, playing solid defense and doing the whole "I'm a stellar guy to have in the locker room, unlike just about everyone you had on this team since 2007" thing. Dwight Howard's stats since December 22: 14.2 points and 12.1 rebounds. Remember when I wrote during 2004's Draft Diary that Orlando should take Okafor over Howard? I'm still alive!!!! YOU CAN DO IT, EMEKA!!!!

Pau Gasol (two years, $38.3 million): Overpaid only for "It's stupid to pay Pau $19 million a year to play 25 feet from the basket like he's Eryan Ilyasova" reasons. Blame Mike D'Antonio (as my dad calls him); don't blame Gasol. But that's why the Lakers will deal him for an inferior/cheaper player this summer … and then Pau will come back to haunt them. You wait.

Kobe Bryant (two years, $58.3 million): For the Lannister Lakers, winter is coming in the form of a breathtakingly obscene luxury tax bill. Including Howard's inevitable nine-figure extension this summer, the Lakers could be staring at a tax of between $80 million and $100 million just for next season. The good news: They made $27 kajillion from their Time Warner cable deal. They'll be fine. But if the Lakers simply traded the last year of Kobe's deal for nothing this summer to a team with crazy amounts of cap space — say, Atlanta — they'd save somewhere between $100 million and $120 million. They would never do this for all the reasons you know they would never do this.

Which brings me back to last week's point: LeBron James is ABSOLUTELY worth $75 million per season. There's your proof.

Category 6: The 30 Least Cap-Appealing Contracts

Or, the 30 most atrocious contracts, depending on how diplomatic you're feeling. Let's count them down from 30 to 1.

30. Jason Richardson: three years, $16 million
Better known as "The Trade Tax Philly Had to Pay to Get Andrew Bynum." Whoops. That trade was such a catastrophe that FEMA should start airlifting supplies to Sixers fans. Do they have enough food and water? Where do I send money?

29. Nene: four years, $52 million
28. JaVale McGee: four years, $44 million
27. DeAndre Jordan: three years, $33 million

The Nuggets are paying McGee $11 million a year to play 18.7 minutes a game. Not a misprint. And Nene is somehow playing 27 minutes a night in D.C. without averaging 13 points, seven rebounds or one block per game, or shooting 50 percent, which actually seems impossible — I kept staring at these numbers thinking I had a cataract or something. Nobody won that Nene-McGee trade. It was like the Richard Sherman–Skip Bayless fight on First Take — everyone lost. As for Jordan, if you're making eight figures a year, but your coach only plays you half the game and sits you in crunch time for The Artist Formerly Known As Lamar Odom — someone who should NEVER be playing crunch time for any contender that's allegedly trying to win a title — then you're on the list. Sorry.

26. Danny Granger: two years, $27 million
The bad news: He missed two-thirds of the season with a bum knee, came back, played a week, looked terrible, and now he's out again. The good news: He's still having a better 2013 season than Fran Vazquez.

25. Rudy Gay: three years, $53.7 million
Most fans love the idea of Rudy: 6-foot-8, defends either forward spot, good athlete, unafraid at crunch time, seems like he's good. Nobody wants to accept that he's a horrific shooter — repeat: horrific — who excels at posting up smaller defenders, and that's about it. Math doesn't lie: According to Hoopdata.com, Gay is shooting 25 percent on shots from 16 to 23 feet (the worst percentage of anyone who attempted three-plus shots per game from that range) and 23.3 percent from 3 (the worst percentage of anyone who attempted three-plus 3s per game). In other words, Gay attempts nearly 10 shots per game from more than 15 feet and makes two of them. I stand by "horrific."

Now, there's an excellent chance that (a) Gay needed a change of scenery, (b) Z-Bo and Marc Gasol clogged the paint and made it more difficult for him to drive to the hoop (there's some truth to that), (c) he's better off playing the 4 and exploiting quickness mismatches there (à la Carmelo) and (d) this trade could still work out for Toronto if Gay ever stops throwing up bricks. But reading Marc Spears's report that Toronto wants to lock up Gay TO AN EXTENSION this summer … I mean … what???? Why not use these last six weeks to make sure he's still competent offensively before broaching that strategy publicly? What's wrong with these teams?

24. Travis Outlaw: three years, $9 million
One of my favorite bad contracts: The Nets overpaid Outlaw and amnestied him within the span of 18 months, which intrigued the pathetic Kings so much that they immediately offered him a multiyear deal. Whaaaaaaaaat? Don't these teams have scouts? If you're wondering, no amnestied player has ever been re-amnestied; it's against the rules. Couldn't we name that rule for Travis Outlaw? It's the least we could do.

23. Brandon Roy: one year, $5.1 million
I was personally offended by this one. Here's Minnesota trying to build a playoff team despite two-plus decades of bad luck and bad breaks, and here's Brandon Roy saying, I know I had to retire in my mid-20s because my knees are bone-on-bone, but I tried that Kobe/Germany treatment and now I'm feeling pretty good! These two ships should have just passed in the night without ever stopping, right? That didn't keep David Kahn from amnestying Darko Milicic and giving away former top-four pick Wesley Johnson to Phoenix, just so he had enough cap space to sign Nicolas Batum to a restricted offer sheet (Portland quickly matched) and throw a $5.1 million prayer at Roy's knees (which didn't make it to Thanksgiving). The T-Wolves could have practically signed Randy Foye AND Carlos Delfino for what they gave Roy.

To recap: The T-Wolves spent $10.3 million on Darko and Roy so they could give away the fourth pick of the 2010 draft to Phoenix … and this wasn't even one of David Kahn's five worst decisions as Minnesota's GM. Come on, I have to.


22. Kris Humphries: two years, $24 million
Popular opinion alert: We shouldn't live in a world in which Kris Humphries makes $12 million a year.

Unpopular opinion alert: I don't mind this contract because, next season, he morphs into Kris Humphries's Expiring Contract and becomes trade fodder for Dwight Howard, Kevin Love or whomever else.8 If you're a wealthy team, why not always make sure you have one eight-figure expiring contract for trade purposes … you know, just in case?

21. Andrew Bynum: one year, $16.5 million
I hate putting an expiring contract this high, but when a playoff team trades one of the best defenders in basketball (Andre Iguodala), the league's fourth-leading rebounder (22-year-old breakout star Nikola Vucevic), the 15th pick in last year's draft (Moe Harkless) and a future no. 1 pick for three years of Jason Richardson (covered above) and zero games of a franchise center … I mean … has there ever been a worse trade? They went from "Second-Round Up-and-Comers With a Bright Future" to "The Lottery and Little to No Future" in one transaction.

Important note: I liked the trade for them. They had to do it! They flipped a Franchise Player Coin and watched in horror as it came up tails. Those are the breaks. Watching Bynum hit the open market this summer is going to be riveting. I'm feeling a two-year, $30 million deal with a team option for year three from Phoenix, a team that is the odds-on favorite to be involved in basketball's first major PED scandal had phenomenal success rehabbing injury risks over the years.

20. Jan Vesely: four years, $17.3 million
Vesely brought a hot girlfriend to the 2011 draft, and since then, it's been one long bungee jump that won't end. Six things you might not know/remember about the Janster:

1. He already has 23 DNPs this season.

2. He has nearly as many fouls (86) as points (94).

3. Repeat: He has nearly as many fouls as points.

4. The Wizards owe him $3.5 million next season, but after that, they can bail from the last two years and $10.5 million of his deal — something that's only happened three other times in the past 10 drafts (Jonny Flynn, Hasheem Thabeet and Shelden Williams).9

5. He's 328th in PER right now, six away from last place.

6. I know only one Wizards fan — my buddy House, who says that the Vesely pick makes him feel the same way he did when Cousin Sal was throwing up fried food in House Eats 3, and that as bad as Vesely's numbers are, it's even worse when you're watching him. Says House, "He can't play basketball. You don't need to say anything else."

The moral of the story: Maybe that isn't a disastrous contract, but when you throw in the real estate (no. 6), the wasted money (not overwhelming, but still), the stench of bad luck/bad management (not only did the Wiz land the only no. 1 overall pick from 2008 through 2011 that wasn't Derrick Rose, Blake Griffin or Kyrie Irving, they ended up with zilch from the 2009 and 2011 drafts despite landing the fifth and sixth picks), and the constant game-after-game reminder that you totally screwed up … it's more than a little atrocious.

19. Marvin Williams: two years, $15.8 million
His sparkling 10.03 PER ranks him 285th in the league, just ahead of Kevin Seraphin, Joel Anthony and Kendrick Perkins. Hey, at least he's still 43 spots ahead of Jan Vesely. At some point before I die, I want to know why Kevin O'Connor flipped Devin Harris's expiring deal for two years of Marvin Williams. There has to be an answer that doesn't involve the words "nude photos" and "or else."

18. Kendrick Perkins: three years, $25.4 million
He's headed for his second-straight Charlie Ward Trophy, given annually to the player on an NBA contender who plays far too many minutes for that contender, to the utter confusion of just about everyone. What's the appeal of playing four-on-five offensively10 and slowing down an athletically potent team if you're not playing Memphis (Gasol), San Antonio (Duncan) or the Lakers (Howard)? It's a great question. I don't have an answer. And yes, if Oklahoma City could have dumped Perkins's contract, they never would have traded James Harden and they'd be going for 70 wins right now.11

17. Deron Williams: five years, $98 million
Would have ranked in the top three had we finished this list five weeks ago, but Williams went on a tear over these last 18 games: 18.4 PPG, 7.4 APG, 46 percent shooting, 47 percent on 3s. (Listening.) Hold on, you're saying that shouldn't be considered a "tear" for someone making nearly $100 million through 2017? Excellent point. It's hard to look at these numbers …

2008: 18.8 PPG, 10.5 APG, 51% FG, 40% 3FG, 20.8 PER
2011: 20.1 PPG, 10.3 APG, 44% FG, 33% 3FG, 21.2 PER
2013: 17.4 PPG, 7.5 APG, 42% FG, 37% 3FG, 18.1 PER

… without wondering what happened to Deron Williams. And that's before you get to Jerry Colangelo calling him out for being out of shape last summer, or this eye-opening piece about how ineffective his drives have been, or even these insanely revealing "clutch" numbers (of anyone who's attempted at least 40 shots in the last five minutes of a close game, Williams's 20.9 FG percentage ranks the lowest BY FAR). He's also failing the Eye Test; he just doesn't look like the same guy. So don't feel bad about not getting him last summer because your owner was filming a Shark Tank episode, Dallas fans. That summer ended up looking like this for your boys.


16. Rodney Stuckey: two years, $17 million12
15. Charlie Villaneuva: two years, $16.6 million
14. Ben Gordon: two years, $25.6 million
This section is sponsored by Joe Dumars Cap Space Cologne! That's right, if you want to smell like someone just tipped you over inside a Porta Potty, try Joe Dumars Cap Space Cologne — you only have to spray it once, and then you can't get away from the smell for three to five years!

Anyway, I wanted to mention a great NBA "What If?" that's definitely getting added to my Book of Basketball if I ever write another edition. Recently, Adrian Wojnarowski reported that Detroit nearly acquired Kobe Bryant for Rip Hamilton, Tayshaun Prince and a couple of no. 1 picks in the summer of 2007, before Buss and Kobe vetoed the trade together and gave the Kobe-Lakers relationship one more chance. Dumars kept his Pistons together for one last Eastern Conference finals run, then sent Chauncey Billups and Antonio McDyess to Denver for Allen Iverson's expiring contract, which ruined their 2009 season but gave them enough cap space to sign … wait for it … Villanueva and Gordon.

Had that Kobe trade gone through, the Pistons would have kept competing for titles, and Dumars would have been remembered as one of the great GMs of all time. Instead, he's remembered for a variety of things: the 2004 title, Rip for Stack, Ben Wallace, the calamitous Darko pick, the Rasheed trade, the Monroe/Drummond picks, that awful Billups trade, those three ghastly signings … he's all over the map. But one thing we've definitely learned: You don't want to give him cap space. And he has it this summer. So look out, Pistons fans.

Last note: Villanueva has a player option for next season for $8.5 million. When asked if he was picking it up, Villanueva responded, "It's obvious what I'm going to do. Would you let that money go?" Hey, high school seniors — it's not too late to make that your yearbook quote.

13. Cancer: three years, $18 million
Whoops, my bad — that was a typo. Let's try that again.

13. Michael Beasley: three years, $18 million
Much better. You don't need advanced stats to tell you that it sucks to have Michael Beasley on your basketball team. Heck, you don't even need normal stats. But this is funny: Phoenix gets outscored by 11.2 points per 100 possessions with Beasley and 2.8 points without him. In other words, they'd improve by 8.3 points per 100 possessions simply by taping him to a Gatorade bucket for three hours a night. Ladies and gentlemen, Michael Beasley!

12. The Future Amnesty Guys
We already covered them in Category 4, but you can't create a "30 Worst Contracts" list without including Miller (three years, $18.6 million), Gooden (three years, $20 million) and Ty Thomas (three years, $26.1 million). At least they can be amnestied without taking a prolonged are-we-sure-we-want-to-do-this gulp, unlike …

11. Carlos Boozer: three years, $47.1 million
How many NBA fans have gotten sucked into the "Carlos Boozer gives you 15 points and nine rebounds every night and always plays hard, how bad could his contract be?" vortex before going onto HoopsHype.com, checking out the numbers and screaming, "AHHHHHHHHHHHH!" when they see them? It's personally happened to me five times. And I might be headed for no. 6 in about three weeks. While we're here, kudos to Booze for dropping the spray-paint routine and going back to the pure head shave. We all appreciate it.

10. Landry Fields: three years, $18.73 million
Don't forget, Toronto offered Fields too much money as a strategic ploy. (Not a typo.) They were hoping the Knicks would knock themselves out of the Steve Nash sweepstakes to match the offer, leaving Toronto as Nash's only suitor. Instead, Nash went to the Lakers and New York gleefully stuck Toronto with Fields, making him the Kip Addotta of 2012 free agency (see this column for an explanation). What's the right word for that chain of events? I'm going with "hilarious!" unless you can top it.

Meanwhile, Fields is turning into the Dave Stapleton of basketball — instead of getting better every year like every other young player, he's somehow getting worse.

2011: 9.7 PPG, 6.4 RPG, 50% FG, 39% 3FG, 77% FT, 13.5 PER.
2012: 8.8 PPG, 4.2 RPG, 46% FG, 26% 3FG, 56% FT, 12.1 PER.
2013: 4.7 PPG, 4.2 RPG, 45% FG, 8% 3FG, 70% FT, 10.2 PER.

Translation: This is threatening to replace the murder subplot in Season 2 of Friday Night Lights as the most painful story line involving someone named Landry. Stay tuned.

9. Hedo Turkoglu: two years, $23.8 million
At least Hedo had the dignity to get suspended for steroids and save Orlando 20 games' pay (about $2.9 million). So that was nice of him. Do you want to make the snarky "I'm sure it was a total coincidence that Dwight Howard's two best teammates from Orlando's improbable 2009 playoff run never played that well again and both ended up getting suspended for PEDs, because there's noooooo waaaaaaaay the NBA has a PED problem" joke, or should I take it? Actually, you have it. I insist.

8. Andrew Bogut: two years, $27.35 million
7. Andris Biedrins: two years, $18 million
6. Richard Jefferson: two years, $21.2 million
Hold on, we have to wait for the Warriors fans to stop screaming.

(Couple more seconds.)

(Couple more.)

And we're good. This was a dramedy of errors that, collectively, seemed very Warriorsish. First, their decision to amnesty Charlie Bell (over just buying him out) so they could give DeAndre Jordan (no. 27 on this list, mind you) an overpriced offer sheet was unfathomable, especially when they had Biedrins (three years, $27 million remaining) doing everything short of carrying a "PLEASE AMNESTY ME" sign into games. Their decision to turn Monta Ellis and Ekpe Udoh into the Bogut/Jefferson contracts wasn't indefensible — just super-risky — and so far it's failed about as badly as any trade that doesn't include the words "Andrew Bynum." Bogut looks like he's physically breaking down, and that's being kind.

But here's the real killer. Multiple sources have told me that, when Oklahoma City's Sam Presti decided to shop James Harden, Golden State was his first call. He wanted Klay Thompson and a pick. The Warriors would only consider the trade if Oklahoma City took back Biedrins or Jefferson for 2013 expirings, knowing they'd get crushed by the luxury tax in 2014 with Harden's extension plus Steph Curry's extension plus David Lee plus Bogut/Jefferson/Biedrins.13 At that point, Presti went to Washington (offering Harden for Bradley Beal, and unbelievably getting turned down), then Houston (where the shopping heated up). Presti never ended up calling Golden State back.

Really, the Warriors were felled by New Owner Syndrome. I like Joe Lacob — in the long run, he'll be fine. But when you give competitive billionaires an NBA team, they're rarely (if ever) patient. They want to win right away, and they're always going to plow ahead with a couple of risky/splashy moves because they don't know any better yet. Wyc Grousbeck, Mark Cuban, Ted Leonsis, Dan Gilbert … name a new-wave owner who wasn't a cheapskate (I'm looking at you, Robert Sarver) and I guarantee they battled New Owner Syndrome. For Lacob, the DeAndre/Bell and Bogut/Jefferson moves were his N.O.S. moments. Remember, Dr. Jerry Buss once made Mitch Kupchak the highest-paid forward in basketball — that was one of the original N.O.S. moments. You can't fight it off unless you're an unredeeming skinflint of a cheapskate. (Again, staring right at you, Robert Sarver.)

5. Andrea Bargnani: three years, $33 million
Player A: 29.2 MPG, 13.0 PPG, 3.7 RPG, 40% FG, 31% 3FG, 11.4 PER.
Player B: 29.7 MPG, 12.0 PPG, 7.3 RPG, 39% FG, 32% 3FG, 12.4 PER.

Player A is Bargnani. Player B is Byron Mullens.

WHAT THE HELL HAPPENED TO YOU, ANDREA BARGNANI????????14

4. Eric Gordon: four years, $58.4 million
His missed games starting with his rookie year in 2008: 4, 20, 26, 57, 37 (and counting). You'd have to be doing drugs to deal for that monstrosity of a contract; I'd need to see one full healthy season from him before I considered it. Could the Chris Paul trade have worked out any worse for New Orleans? They ended up with a possible lemon (Gordon), a few months of Chris Kaman (long gone), a year and a half of Al-Farouq Aminu (leaving after this season), and a lottery pick they turned into Austin Rivers (who generated some "historically bad" buzz over the holidays before breaking his hand last week). That's Reason No. 479 why you should ALWAYS swap a bunch of promising young guys, draft picks and whatever else for a Guaranteed Sure Thing, whether it's real sports or fantasy sports. If you're turning quarters and dimes into a dollar, you do it. And you do it without blinking.

3. Gerald Wallace: four years, $40 million
To refresh your memory …

The Nets traded a top-three protected first-rounder for Wallace last February, never giving that pick top-10 protection because, as GM Billy King would explain later, the Nets didn't believe there were any impact rookies beyond the top three, and "we felt the player that we may draft beyond the protection would be somebody that would probably take a couple years (to develop)."

Thanks to that confusing logic, the Blazers stumbled into the sixth pick (courtesy of the Nets) and took Damian Lillard … who's averaging 18.6 points a game en route to the Rookie of the Year award. So that was awkward. The next three picks: Harrison Barnes, Terrence Ross and Andre Drummond, all of whom make three times less than Wallace (signed to that $40 million extension in July) and have eight times more trade value. Maybe it's a bad idea to decide in March that you like only three players in June's NBA draft, and that workouts and interviews couldn't possibly change that opinion? Just throwing it out there.

The good news? If the Nets didn't trade for Wallace, they wouldn't have been able to pay Deron Williams $98 million for the five years after his prime, and they wouldn't have been able to lock down Wallace at $40 million right after his career careered off a cliff.

2012: 13.8 PPG, 6.7 RPG, 45.4% FG, 80% FT, 16.0 PER
2013: 8.5 PPG, 5.2 RPG, 41.5% FG, 65% FT, 12.5 PER

That's not a slump, that's NBA menopause. We've seen it happen with too many athletic NBA forwards over the years — once they lose it, it never comes back. Repeat: NBA menopause. It's a real thing. Anyone know how to swear in Russian?

2. Amar'e Stoudemire: three years, $65.1 million
1. Joe Johnson: four years, $89.3 million

You knew it would come down to these two — they're like the Jay-Z and Kanye of atrocious contracts. Joe makes more money, but Stoudemire's contract is 100 percent uninsured.15 Joe is a better and more durable player, but Stoudemire's contract expires one year earlier. Neither contract could be traded under any circumstances (not during the New and Improved Luxury Tax era, anyway). Both contracts make me giggle if I look at the numbers long enough.

So this is close. Damned close. Johnson gets the hammer for one reason: for the 2015-16 season, after Stoudemire's contract comes off New York's cap, Brooklyn has to pay Joe Johnson nearly $25 million. The exact number: $24,893,863. They're also on the hook for $31.15 million of Wallace and Williams that year, which means Brooklyn will be shelling out more than $56 million for three well-past-their-prime players that season. No wonder everyone keeps driving up the price tags of NBA franchises — everyone wants to own an NBA team in 2016 just for their cut of Brooklyn's luxury tax fees.

Once upon a time, I wondered if Mikhail Prokhorov was the Russian Mark Cuban. Really, he's the Russian Ted Stepien, right? I predict the NBA will create a Prokhorov Rule someday, and it's going to be awesome, and that's that.
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